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Abstract 
This thesis is about international trade and development. Although external factors 
are important in understanding the situation of current developing countries, internai 
factors also need to be considered seriously. For instance, the confiicting interests of the 
various groups comprising the society might be crucial in explaining why sorne countries 
remain trapped in poverty while others seem to be doing pretty well. Focusing on any 
of tho. sets of factors can yield ra ther different insights on development issues, while 
painting to sorne confiicting solutions. 
The first essay builds upon the idea that gains from trade come from a certain degree 
of specialization among trade partners and challenges the view that specialization in the 
case of an agriculture-based developing country might imply a higher reliance on low 
skill labor. This view often leads to consider trade as a step away from the much 
awaited structural transformation of the economy, which can only come with increases 
in agricultural productivity. In this first chapter, we suggest that it needs not be the 
case. We show that trade openness can in fact trigger the structural transformation of 
such an agrarian society. It can induce a higher reliance on human capital accumulation 
and produce the necessary productivity gains for an economy to pick up. Our dynamic 
general equilibrium madel provides a clear illustration of the mechanics behind such 
structural transformation. 
Obviously, for the above mechanics to come into play, the provision of education 
resources needs be sufficient , allowing for permanent human capital accumulation over 
time. However, poverty may limit the supply of these resources, increasing the contest 
over their allocation as every group daims a higher share of it. 
In the second essay, we do explore the political determinants of societies' toler-
ance for social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or race. We develop a 
political-economic madel in arder to understand the emergence of social exclusion even 
in presence of a democratie voting system. To the extent that population size is , at 
least initially, the only source of asymmetry between rival groups, our analysis suggests 
t.hat t.he introduction of democratie voting rnay not be sufficient to save small , but 
visible, minorities from social exclusion. Only where this asymmetry is moderate, can 
the introduction ·of democratie voting suffi ce to avoid sorne groups being excluded from 
sharing in on public education resources. 
The last chapter of the thesis deals with the issue of child trafficking, a thriving 
business that can be linked to economie globalization. The chapter highlights key eco-
nomie characteristics of this business and shows that the fight against child trafficking is 
far from trivial. Our analysis suggests that supply-side policies have very limited effect 
unless preceded by attacks on the demand side. We work within a madel of a source 
country to highlight the necessary ingredients of a successful international cooperation 
towards the elimination of child trafficking. 
Keywords: Trade; Extension services ; Development; Social Exclusion; Democracy; 
Child Trafficking; Cooperation 
V li 
Résumé 
Cette thèse t raite de questions liées au commerce et au développement international. 
S'il est vrai que dans un contexte d 'intégration croissante des économies, la sit uation 
des pays en développement se comprend mieux en référence à des facteurs externes, l'on 
ne saurait ignorer l'importance de facteurs internes tels que la co-existence de groupes 
sociaux aux intérêts parfois divergeants. Chaque angle d 'analyse peut ainsi apporter un 
éclairage différent sur la même réali té, snscitant autant de voies d 'action possible. 
Le premier essai explore les oppor tuni tés de développement liées au commerce in-
ternational et ce du point de vue d 'un petit pays ayant un avantage compara tif dans 
la production de biens agricoles . La production de biens agricoles nécessitant peu ou 
pas de main-d 'œuvre qualifiée, il est coutume de considérer qu 'une spécialisation dans 
ce type d 'activité limite les chances de voir se former au sein de la société considérée 
une masse de capital humain suffisamment importante pour impulser la dynamique de 
développement qui passe par une accumulation substant ielle de ce facteur. Ce chapitre 
propose une théorie de la transformation structurelle induite par le commerce inter-
national, où recherche scientifique et capital se combinent pour améliorer la produc-
tivité agricole et déclencher un progrès technique favorable aux travailleurs qualifiés. 
Le modèle élaboré illustre clairement les mécanismes en jeu et permettant à l'économie 
d 'émerger de sa situation initia le de sous-développement . 
La rareté des ressources jouant, des conflits de réparti t ion peuvent naît re de la 
volonté de certains groupes d 'accroître la par t qui leur est échue. Le deuxième chapi tre 
élabore ainsi un modèle poli tco-économique dont le but est d 'expliquer l'émergence de 
l'exclusion sociale au sein d 'une société démocratique, exclusion basée sur l 'ethnie, la 
race, ou la religion et qui consiste pour certains groupes à être exclus de la jouissance de 
ressources communes. Sur la base d 'un modèle où à l'origine les groupes diffèrent unique-
ment par leurs tailles respectives, nous montrons qu 'un système de vote démocratique 
n 'est pas suffisant pour éliminer l'exclusion sociale au sein d 'une société à forte asymétrie 
entre les groupes. Nos résultats suggèrent que seule une société dont les groupes sont 
de taille relativement comparable peut efficacement contrer l 'émergeuce de l'exclusion 
sociale, aucun des groupes en présence n 'ayant intérêt à la soutenir dans le cadre d 'un 
vote démocratique . 
Avec la globalisation des économies, se sont également développées toutes sortes 
d'activi tés illégales à l 'instar du t rafic international d 'enfants dont les pays en développement 
sont très souvent les fournisseurs. Le t roisième essai élabore ainsi un modèle économique 
dans le but de comprendre les déterminants d 'un commerce en pleine expansion et illus-
tre les limi tes d 'une stratégie de lutte axée sur un seul aspect du marché, le côté offre 
en l 'occurence. Le cadre d 'analyse d 'une économie sous-développée sit uée à la source 
des flux de trafic nous permet de montrer la nécessité d 'une meilleure coopération sur 
le plan international, et combinant des mesures tant du côté de l'offre que du côté de la 
demande. 
Mots clés: Commerce; Recherche; Développement; Exclusion ; Démocrat ie; E nfants . 
General Introduction 
Taking a look at today's developed nations in an historical perspective, one cannot 
help but notice a stark contrast between their current economie si tuation and that of 
sorne decades ago. Important changes along their economie and social structure 
across tirne appear to have propelled their societies out of a subsistence stage, and 
into· a rnass consurnption one. This observation has inspired a linear theory of 
developrnent in the tradition of Rostow ( 1960), who argues th at growth in 
industrialization irnrnediately follows subsistence and pre-conditions to take-off 
stages, leading to sustai ned growth and ultimately to high-rnass consurnption. 
Although this theory of developrnent fits the historical experience of Western Europe 
societies, it seerns to lack a real explanatory power when it cornes to understanding 
why today's developing countries have failed to follow suit as to why current. 
Rostow's lecture on the development process is hence purely descriptive in the sense 
that there is no mention of the forces that allow a society to rnove from one stage to 
the next. However, Rostow's theory suggests that the developrnent process is 
fundarnentally dynamic. 
The challenge facing economie developrnent theorists is therefore to corne up 
with sorne plausible answers to the real world differences that one observes both at 
the international level between countries and at the national leve! between 
individuals . Regardless of which approach one relies on, i.e. whether ernpirical, using 
data, or theoretical, ali the contributions in this field airn at gaining more insight into 
the developrnent process , so as to provide sorne useful policy recornrnendations. 
Therefore, there is no convincing reason as to why one approach should prevai l over 
the other. Ernpirical investigations have the rnerit of overcoming the crucial issue of 
data availability, but are still subject to other concerns pertaining to data resorting -
reliability of data sets, shortcuts of most econometrie rnethods, etc. Likewise, the theo 
2 
retical approach is sometimes criticized because of the need to rely on sorne simplifying 
assumptions in order to solve models that would otherwise be highly complex. 
Notwithstanding the above, the literature in this field and the numerous pieces of 
response to the issue of underdevelopment at least show how complex is the problem. 
Poverty appears to be a multifaceted reality both at the micro and the macro levels, 
such that its various aspects may hardy be uncovered at first glanee. Under develop-
ment may thus be t ackled under different angles. Following Lucas (1988)on may stress 
the mechanics of economie development, in thE;) sense that the emphasis is put on the 
forces which enable a society to move away from the subsistence stage, and ultimately 
to reach the mass consumption one. In this case we will be dealing with structural 
transformation , as economie development typically involves important changes in the 
way a society is organized along the social and economie dimensions. This is not to 
say that Lucas (1988) is the first to explore the issue, but that contribution is certainly 
a good illustration of a practice now widespread among development economists and 
stressing the role of human capital accumulation in the course of industrialization. The 
point is particularly relevant in a context of growing trade liberalization. 
As a matter of fact , not only is the technological gap between today's developing 
countries and today's industrialized nations already huge, but the difference seems to 
be increasing as well. This observation has led many development institutions to rec-
ommend more trade liberalization since the 1980ies. Behind this recommendation is the 
idea that trade openness would facilitate technology import, allowing developing coun-
tries to catch up with more advanced economies so as to increase their productivity while 
experiencing a learning-by-doing process . .In the long run, developing countries which 
have long been lagging from behind are suppose to take advantageof these interactions 
to develop sorne local t echnologies in substitution to the imported ones. 
Lucas (1990) has pointed to the fact trade liberalization would not necessarily help 
the development cause of poor countries, except if they have the appropriate. human 
capital needed to handle cutting-edge technologies. that line of reasoning then opened 
the door to a passionate debate question the capacity of poor countries to foster human 
capital accumulation within an international environment which surreptitiously pushes 
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their economy towards specialization in· low-skilled labor intensive productions. This 
explains why some developing count ries were, and are still reluctant to further open 
their economy to international trade, as they dread this may compromise their chances 
for a long time. Renee the dilemma facing the developing world, which has to choose 
between specialization and economie diversification in their development strategy. My 
contribution to this debate aims to show that product specialization in crop commodi-
ties does not necessarily preclude human capital accumulation, which implies that the 
possibility to experience structural transformation, i.e. industrialization remains. This 
is the focus of the first essay, where I consider a developing economy whose compar-
ative advantage lies in crop production, and I investigate the conditions under which 
specialization in agricult ural commodities may be a viable development strategy. 
The possibility for a developing economy to experience sustained human capital ac-
cumulation following trade liberalization has already been extensively investigated in 
the literature. First contributions . date as early as 1983: See Cartiglia (1997) , Eich-
ers (1999), and Ranjan (2001) for optimistic conclusions, and Findlay and Kierskowski 
(1983), Matsuyama (1992) and Stokey (1996) for the opposite. Given these two strands 
of the literature, my contribution lies in the novelty of the mechanism that I put for-
ward to show how an agriculture-based economy might take advantage of international 
trade to foster human capital accumulation. For agriculture-based developing econ-
omy choosing to specialize in crop production, monitoring farm activities and providing 
farmers with improved inputs are of prime importance, especially if one is to achieve 
substantial productivity growth in agriculture. In my model, not only is the agricultural 
research and extension services sector the place for RD activities, but this intermediate 
sector is also responsible for providing technical assistance and monitoring farmers in 
implementing the latest technologies and using other improved inputs. Ultimately, the 
success of a product specialization strategy is conditional upon the agricultural research 
and extension services sector , effectively playing its role. By lowering the priee of the 
import-competing good, trade liberalization causes the reallocation of physical capital 
towards agriculture, while skilled-labor flows into the skill-intensive, intermediate sec-
tor. Thes.e shifts then alter relative priees, rising the skill premium in wage which in 
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t urn provides forward-looking individuals with the incentive to accumulate human cap-
itaL This process of human capital accumulation and the resulting productivity gaius 
in agriculture therefore fuel the structural transformation of the economY: in this modeL 
Notwithstanding the importance of agricultural research and extension services as 
described above, it appears t hat the highlighted mechanism may fail to come into play 
should skill labor faU short . This then points to the provision of educational resources 
as part of the strategy, given that the rising skill prernium in wage already provides 
the required incentive for human capital accumulation on a private basis. Holding this 
way of reasoning makes it easier to understand why the quality of public instit utions 
has drawn so much attention in recent as a major cause of underdevelopment. To the 
extent t hat provision of public educational resources is lirnited, there certainly is a strong 
temptation for sorne social groups to bias their allocation in such a way tha t benefi ts 
t heir own interest. Social exclusion on the basis of race, religiün or ethnicity may tht;n 
emerge within the society and gives rise to situations where sorne groups are frustrated 
in sharing in on common ressources . The second essay of my thesis is a contribut ion 
to t his strand of the literature on public institutions in their relation with economie 
. development , and aims at understanding the politico-determinants of social exclusion . 
Existing models of social exclusion mainly put the emphasis on its economie con-
sequences, stressing its detrimental effects on growth, - Easterly and Levine (1997), or 
its worsening effects with regards to income inequality - Gradstein and Schiff (2~06). 
Incursions into the political determinants of social exclusion were initiated only re-
cently with Gradstein (2003) , Reynal-Querol (2005) , and Gradstein and Schiff (2006) . 
Reynal-Querol (2005) argues that social exclusion follows from a democratie voting 
system where people still strongly feel their affiliation to specifie social groups, wherea.s 
Gradstein (2003) points to intra-group human capital externalities as a major factor. As 
both papers did not take the cost of exclusion into account , Gradstein and Schiff (2006) 
tried to do so by resorting to an exogenous cost taking the form a rebellion threat from 
t qose groups experiencing exclusion. However, not only . is this exogenous cost ques-
tionable, but in addition, Gradstein and Schiff (2006) assumed that only marginalized 
groups have the option to privately invest in their offspring's education. The latter fea-
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ture clearly stands at odd with the empirical evidence which shows that U.S. households 
all devote a significant share of their income to their children 's education, no matter 
their income category. 1 
Unlike Gradstein and Schiff (2006) and in line with empirical observations , I develop 
a model where all households have the option to invest in their offspring's education . 
This feature makes the cost of social exclusion endogenous to household decisions, sine 
resources allocation for participation into the exclusion group contest effort trades off 
private investment in one's child 's human capital. My analysis then suggests that to the 
extent that population size is the only source of asymmetry between competing social 
groups, a democratie voting system cannot preclude the emergence of social exclusion, 
unless there is no clear majority. This is because absence a significant asymmetry in 
population sizes, no group is better off supporting social exclusion. However, as the 
asymmetry in population sizes increases, a society with high degree of social exclusion 
becomes interesting for the majority group, especially as each of its member only con-
tributes a small amount into the group's contest effort, which leaves room for more 
private investment in the human capital formation of their offspring. 
The analysis above clearly points to social exclusion with respect to public resources 
like education or health care, as a potential channel for intergenerational transmission 
of social status. Notwithstanding this feature, the fact that not all social groups can 
invest alike in the contest effort goes far beyond the sole human capital aspect, but 
rather illustrates a more general issue, which is, not all household can afford the same 
facilities to their offspring. In a broader setting where child wellbeing depends on 
parental investment, it is reasonable to think that in relative terrns, wealthy households 
would devote more resources to their children .2 
Furthermore, in extreme poVerty situations where the household survival is at stake, 
it is not rare to see children called into rescue to help securing household income with 
some paid jobs . As such situations are more likely to arise in developing countries, 
t his explains why development economies literature has been notably enriched in recent 
1See the 2004 and 2005 Reports by the United States Department of Agriculture - USDA . 
2T his is clearly evidenced in USDA annual reports. 
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years with contributions on the child tabor phenomenon- Basu and Van (1998), Dessy 
and Pallage (2001), etc. The fact that child workers can be hired to take part into 
the production process then raises the issue of their safety out of the familial frame, 
specially as sorne bad-entended individuals may be tempted to take advantage of their 
naivety. This certainly explains the adoption of several international conventions, aimed 
at preserving child's rights while protecting them from exploitative forms of tabor - cf· 
Convention C-182 of the International Labor Organization. 
Notwithstanding the ongoing debate with regards to the welfare effets of such con-
vent ions - Dessy and Pallage (2005), Rogers and Swinnerton (2005), the question of their 
implementation deserves sorne investigation as well. As a matter of fact, far from being 
internai to sorne marginal countries, child trafficking, connected with the worst forms of 
child tabor through the C-182 Convention, appear to be a transboundary phenomenon 
involving well-structured criminal networks. 
In the context of a global world economy with substantial differences in living stan-
dards across countries, and assuming that both public and private resources are needed 
in providing children with a safe living environment , it is reasonable to wonder if the 
parents and the respective government of different countries, share the same capacity to 
provide their children with such an environment . The final essay of my thesis hence de-
velops a two-sector , general equilibrium model where both parental and public resources 
are put into contribution to protect children against child-traffickers entrepreneurs in a 
small open economy . As traffickers are mainly motivated by the sake of profits, they 
typically adjust their effort to the priee of a child victim on international markets. This 
setting allows me to show that because sorne countries are, at least in relat ive terms, 
more effective in protecting their children, the demand for child victims switches towards 
those countries which cannot provide a similar protection, rising the international priee 
of child victims. Struggling with poverty and scarce resources, parents and government 
in the latter countries helplessly witness increased trafficking activities at home, explain-
ing the international polarization of trafficking fl.ows as can be seen in the data. My 
model points to a negative externality arising from sorne countries effectiveness on sorne 
others' ability to cope with child trafl.icking. My analysis therefore advocates the need 
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for a doser international cooperat ion, as well as the need to stress the role of demand 
factors in international conventions, a point that the C-182 Convention clearly misses. 
Chapter 1 
On the Mechanics of Trade-Induced Structural 
Transformation 
ABSTRACT1 
Gains from trade come from a certain degree of specialization arnong trade partners. 
Specialization in the case of an agriculture-based developing country might be feared to 
imply a higher reliance than ever on low skill labor. Trade might thus be seen as a step 
away from the much awaited structural transformation of the economy, which can only 
come with increases in agricultural productivity. In this chapter, we suggest that it needs 
not be the case. We show that trade openness can in fact trigger the structural 
transformation of su ch an agrarian society. lt can induce a higher reliance o"n hu man 
capital accumulation and produce the necessary productivity gains for an economy to 
pick up. Our dynamic general equilibrium mode! provides a clear illustration of the 
mechanics behind such structural transformation. 
1.1 Introduction 
Many developing countries, particularly those from Sub-Saharan Africa, depend heavily 
on agricultural commodities for export earnings (UNCTAD, 2003). From the view-point 
of traditional trade theory, gains from trade come from specialization in goods for which 
1 Co-written with Stephane Pallage and Sylvain Dessy 
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a country has a comparative advantage . 
Yet , industrial revolutions require structural transformations, which - one may rea-
sonably fear - do not naturally derive from specialization in agriculture. "Globalisa-
tian," as anti-trade activis ts typically caU the graduai removal of trade barriers, may 
increase the divide between rich and poor countries if it implies that agriculture-based 
countries are pushed away from the necessary conditions to achieve structural trans-
formation. Cat ching up with industrialized countries would then be still further from 
re ach . 
In this chapter , we show that , unlike commonly believed , structural t ransformations 
canin fact be induced by a country's specialization in agriculture. Crucial to this process 
is t he development of a sizable sector of agricultural research and ext ension services.2 
As a services provision sector , agricultural research and extension relies intensively 
on skilled labor - agronornists and agricultural t echnicians - for the design and transfer 
of organizational methods, new crop varieties, management systems, production and 
marketing technologies. The development of the research and extension services sector is 
t herefore of prime importance for agriculture-based developing countries. Yet , in t hese 
countries, shortage of skill supply seriously lirnits the availability of quality research 
and extension services to farmers, which in turn limits on-farm productivity growth. 
To the extent that structural transformations involve sustained growth in the relative 
proportion of skilled labor , we show in this chapter that a trade-induced specialization 
in agriculture can indeed enhance the development process of agrarian economies . 
We formalize this idea using a three-sector intertemporal general equilibrium madel. 
For the small agriculture-based economy we consider , trade openness has three direct 
effects. First, it lowers the relative priee of the import-competing good, and pools both 
physical capital and skilled labor out of the import-competing sector. The skilled la-
bor thus released may be absorbed by the research and extension service sector , while 
the released physical capital maves into the farming sector, as a complementary in-
2 Agricul tural ext ension encompasses a range of services aimed at expancling farmers' exp os ure to 
effective organisation and management skills , and to new technologies. lt focuses on helping farmers 
master techniques and socioeconomic knowledge necessary to the improvement of the productivi ty of 
thei r far ms . 
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put to agricultural research and ext ension. Second, it unleashes a process of capital-
augmenting technical change that reduces the importance of unskilled labor relative to 
physical capital in farming . This causes farmers to substitute capital for unskilled labor 
as the demand for agricultural extension services rises. Third, trade-induced special-
ization causes the return to skill investment to rise, thus leading to an increase in the 
supply of skilled labor in the long-run. 
The ability of agricultural research and extension services to generat e aggregate 
productivity gains is by no means a purely theoretical idea. It has been shown that 
these services are responsible for a substantial share of TFP growth in India over the 
last three decades (Evenson et al., 1999) and elsewhere (Evenson, 2001). Estimates of 
the economie impact of agricultural research and extension services vary across regions 
and crops. Evenson (2001) has computed the median estimated internal rate of returns 
to be above 40% for extension services and between 40 and 60% for agricultural research . 
Our theory rests on the fact that capital and skills or the services they provide are 
complementary. This is a well-known fact in manufacturing, for 'inst ance (see Griliches, 
1969, and the vast literature generated by this paper) . It is also the case in agriculture 
where machines may replace large numbers of unskilled workers, but depend heavily 
on the availability of skills, to be operated effi.ciently, adapted to the land a nd to the 
crops. R esearch may also adapt the crops themselves to the soil and the machineïy. 
Hamermesh (1993) compiles evidence of such capital-skill complementarity in many 
sectors, including agriculture. 
The present chapter is conriected to the literature on the human capital effects 
of trade liberalization. Sustained growth in per capita income involves a structural 
transformation of the economy, an important feature of which is the change in the 
skill composition of the labor force. For initially skill-scarce countries, static trade 
models predict that trade liberalization will cause a fall in the return to skill. This 
prediction raises the question of whether, in the long-run, and for an initially skill-
scarce country, trade openness will cause this scarcity to persist. Efforts to address 
this question have essentially pitted two strands of the theoretical literature on trade 
openness and skill-supply dynarnics. Contributions in the fin;L strand include works Ly 
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Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), Matsuyama (1992) , and Stokey (19~6) . These authors 
argue that trade openness for an initia lly skill-scarce country will cause the scarcity 
of skills to persist in the long run. By contrast, the second strand of this literature, 
including contributions by Cartiglia (1997) , Eichers (1999), and Ranj an (2001) overturn 
this prediction. 
A common point in the second strand of this theoretical literature is the emphasis 
on the link between the costs of skill accumulation and the skilled labor wage. Since 
it takes skilled individuals to impart skills, a rise in the skilled labor wage has an 
adverse effect on skill-investment in the presence of credit constraints, because it raises 
education costs. Tli.ese authors argue that trade openness for an initially skill-scarce 
country can correct this adverse credit-constraint effect, by inducing a fall in the skilled 
labor wage. This fall , in turn, by causing education costs to fall , leads to an increase 
in the proportion of individuals who invest in education. The result , they argue, is an 
increase in the supply of skilled labor in the long-run. However , since trade also induces 
a contraction of the import-competing sector , which is intensive in skilled-labor use, 
this prediction implies that the long-run increase in the supply of skilled labor will fail 
to benefit the export sec tor , which, by contrast, is intensive in unskilled labor . Indeed, 
trade-openness ln these models seems to lead to growth in the education sector at the 
expense of the rest of the economy (namely the import-competing sector and the export 
sector) : teachers are hired to train future teachers . In our model, the increase in the 
supply of skilled labor benefits the export sector in two ways. First , it leads to greater 
use of research and extension services in farrning. Second , the increase in the supply 
of research and extension broug~t about by the increase in the skilled labor supply 
triggers a process of agricultural transformation whereby physical capital substitutes 
for unskilled la bor. 
-
Models in that second strand of literature appear to be at odds with éxisting empir-
ical evidence regarding the link between trade openness and the skill-prernium, because 
they imply a decrease is the skill-premium (understood as the ratio of the skilled aud 
unskilled labor wages). Yet for many trade-liberalizing developing countries, available 
evidence reveals rising skilled labor supplies accompanied by non-declining skill-prernia 
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(Rabbins 1996; Arbache, Dickerson and Green, 2004).3 
Unlike this literature, we obtain a positive association between trade openness and 
skill supply that is consistent with this empirical evidence. Our madel ret ains sorne 
features of the second group of trade and factor accumulation models, except for sorne 
important features. First, unlike Cartiglia (1997) , Eichers (1999) and Ranj an (2001), 
our non-traded sector produces an input for the export sector. Second, consistent 
with empirical evidence (for a survey of the empirical findings, see Hamermesh, 1993) , 
we assume a strong substitutability between unskilled labor and capital. Third, the 
availability of agricultural research and extension services increases the importance of 
physical capital relative to unskilled labor in farm production. This is consistent with 
the evidence of a capital-skill complementarity in farming (Hamermesh, 1993). 
Our chapter is also linked to the economie growth literature in which substantial 
ground has been gained on the understanding of the process of structural transforma-
tions (see, e.g. Laitner, 2000; Gollin , P arente, Rogerson, 2002) and the potential role 
of human capital (see, e.g. Temple and Voth, 1998). Our objective in this chapter is 
to show how the removal of trade barriers in an agriculture-based economy, while it 
calls for a stronger specialization in agriculture, cau nevertheless trigger the process of 
structural transformation. 
In the next section, we describe the madel, which we analyse in depth in Section 3. 
We conclude in Section 4. We also provide sorne proofs in Section 5. 
1. 2 The mo del 
We build an overlapping-generations; three-sector economy in which economie activities 
extend over an infinite number of periods. It operates iri discrete time t. There are two 
final goods: a commercial crop (good a) which we take as the numeraire, and an import-
competing good ( m) . Bath final goods are tradable. In addition, there is an intermediate 
good (x), whieh is used as an input into the production of good a. This intermediate 
3 0ther related contributions include Acemoglu (2002, 2003), and Desjounqueres, Machin and Van 
Reenen (1999). 
13 
good is nontradable. The nontradable good sector is the research and extension services 
sector, which provides t echnology-based solutions for relaxing on-farm yield constraints. 
At the beginning of every period, a new generation of two period-lived heterogeneous 
agents is born. This new generation coexists with a generatiuu of old agents. There is 
no population growth. Each generation has total population size normalized at unity. 
Young agents are endowed with a level of physical capital, k, which they rent out to 
firms in the beginning of the first period of their life, at a market priee r. They differ in 
their respective endowment of physical capital, and are distributed across capital levels 
according to a cumulative function, W, with strictly positive p.d.f., '1/J, over the bounded 
support, [0 , k] , 0 < k < oo. The difference in capital endowment is the only source of 
inequality in this environment. Capital fully depreciates within a period.4 
In their first period of life, all agents must decide whether to invest in skill accumu-
lation or to supply unskilled labor to firms from that period on. In their second and 
last period, agents supply labor to firms in exchange for a wage, wi , which depends on 
their skill status i ( i = s if skilled, u if unskilled) . 
Let e be a binary variable taking value 1 if a young ind ividual decides to invest in 
skill acquisition, and 0 if he elects to supply unskilled labor to firms. A young agent who 
chooses e = 0, supplements his capital incarne with an unskilled labor incarne in the 
first period, and remains an unskilled worker throughout his entire lifetime. In contrast, 
an agent who elects for e = 1 will forgo incarne from unskilled labor in the first period, 
in arder to receive a skill-enhancing education, and so becomes a skilled worker in his 
second and last period of life. All education costs are pure opportunity costs .5 
Let Yrt (e, k) denote the incarne at time t of an agent of age TE {1 , 2} having made 
4 Clearly, not allowing for capital accumulation is a simplifying assumption. Since it biases the results 
against structural transformations implying increases in the proportion of skilled workers , it is made 
without loss of generality. We will show that even absent capital accumulat ion , trade may lead to 
such structural transformations in an initially skill-scarce, agriculture-based economy. We thus take the 
strongest case against our daim. 
5 We abstract from education fees. One could argue that education fees are a function of education 
supply and demand as weil as public expenditures on education. As a country opens up to ·trade, an 
increase in the demand for education may initially increase school fees, but as the supply of skilled 
tabor increases, so should the supply of teachers and tax receipts. As a result the speed of structural 
transformation may be somewhat lower in early stages in a mode! with school fees. But our qualitative 
results would not change. 
decision e when his endowment of capital was k: 
{ 
rtk + (1- e)wut 
Yrt(e, k) = 
eWst + (1 - e) Wut 
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forT= 1 
forT= 2 
Let Pi denote t he relative priee of good j (j = m, x) . We use the small country 
assumption , i. e. the priees of exported/imported goods are exogenously determined by 
the international market. We also assume that the international market is stable so 
t hat these priees are constant over time. 
In each period , a typical individual divides his income between the consumpt ion of 
good a (denoted as Ca) and of good m (denoted as Cm )- The lifetime utili ty of an agent 
born in period t is given by: 
(1.1 ) 
where Crt = (Cart )I-L (Cmr t)1- I-L , J.L E (0 , 1) . Agents choose their occupational strategy 
(e) by an t icipating t he consequences this choice will have on t heir lifetime utility which 
in t urn depends on how much they consume in every period. By backward induction, 
forward-looking agents fust determine their opt imallifetime uÙlity given their occupa-
tional choice, then select the occupational option that yields the highest lifetirrie ut ility. 
As discount ing is not central in the question we address, we assume no discount ing to 
simplify the notation. 
An agent 's periodic budget constraint implies: Cart+ PmCmrt :::; Yrt (e, k) . Given 
t he utility function specified in (1.1), we can derive the following demand equations: 
Cart J.LYrt ( e, k) 
Cmrt = (1- J.L) Yrt (e, k) . 
Pm 
(1. 2) 
(1. 3) 
The above demand schedules will prove useful when characterizing skilled and unskilled 
labor supplies. 
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1 . 2 . 1  A g e n t s '  o c c u p a t i o n a l  c h o i c e s  
A t  a n y  d a t e  t ,  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  s k i l l e d  l a b o r  i s  g i v e n  b y  t h e  t o t a l  p r o p o r t i o n ,  T J s t ,  o f  s k i l l e d  
i n d i v i d u a l s .  T h i s  f i g u r e  e q u a l s  t h e  t o t a l  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  a d u l t  a g e n t s  w h o  c h o s e  t o  i n v e s t  
i n  s k i l l  a c q u i s i t i o n  w h e n  y o u n g .  S i n c e  a l l  y o u n g  a g e n t s  a r e  f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g ,  i n  c h o o s i n g  
t h e i r  o c c u p a t i o n ,  t h e y  b a l a n c e  t h e  f u t u r e  b e n e f i t s  a g a i n s t  p r e s e n t  e d u c a t i o n  c o s t s .  
L e t  V  ( e ,  k ,  M t )  d e n o t e  t h e  i n d i r e c t  l i f e t i m e  u t i l i t y  o f  a  y o u n g  a g e n t  w h o  m a k e s  
o c c u p a t i o n a l  c h o i c e ,  e ,  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d ,  w h e n  h e  i s  e n d o w e d  w i t h  a  l e v e l  o f  p h y s i c a l  
c a p i t a l ,  k ,  a n d  p r i e e s  a r e  g i v e n  b y  t h e  v e c t o r  M t  =  ( r t , W u t , Ws t + l , W u t + l , P m ) - F r o m  
( 1 . 1 ) ,  s u b s t i t u t i n g  i n  ( 1 . 2 )  a n d  ( 1 . 3 ) ,  y i e l d s :  
V  ( e ,  k ,  M t )  =  l n  f r t k  +  ( 1 - e )  w u t ]  + l n  [ e w s t + l  +  ( 1 - e )  W u t + l ]  
- ( 1 - J . L )  l n  p m +  Z ,  
( 1 . 4 )  
w i t h  Z ,  a  c o n s t a n t ,  r e s i d u a l  t e r m .  T h u s ,  a  y o u n g  a g e n t  w i l l  c h o o s e  t o  i n v e s t  i n  s k i l l -
e n h a n c i n g  e d u c a t i o n  i f  h i s  e n d o w m e n t ,  k ,  o f  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l  s a t i s f i e s :  
V  ( 1 ,  k ,  M t )  2  V  ( 0 ,  k ,  M t )  
H e  w i l l  t a k e  e m p l o y m e n t  a s  a n  u n s k i l l e d  w o r k e r  o t h e r w i s e .  
L e t  ' 1 3  ( k ,  Bt ,  7 r t + t )  = V  ( 1 ,  k ,  M t ) - V  ( 0 ,  k ,  M t )  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  n e t  g a i n  a n  a g e n t  d e r i v e s  
f r o m  i n v e s t i n g  i n  s k i l l  a c q u i s i t i o n  i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  h i s  l i f e ,  w h e n  h e  i s  e n d o w e d  w i t h  a  
l e v e l  o f  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l  k ,  a n d  f a c e s  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  e d u c a t i o n ,  B t  =  w u t f r t ,  a n d  
a  f u t u r e  s k i l l - p r e m i u m ,  7 r t + l  =  W s t + t / W u t + l ·  U s i n g  ( 1 . 4 ) ,  i t  c a n  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t :  
' 1 3  ( k ,  Bt ,  1 r t + t )  = l n  [  k :  e J  + l n  7 r t + l  .  ( 1 . 5 )  
A s  c a n  b e  i n f e r r e d  f r o m  ( 1 . 5 ) ,  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s ,  t h e  n e t  g a i r i  f r o m  i n v e s t i n g  i n  s k i l l  r i s e s  
w i t h  t h e  a g e n t ' s  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l  e n d o w m e n t ,  k ,  o r  w i t h  t h e  f u t u r e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  s k i l l -
p r e r n i u m ,  7 r t + l ,  w h i l e  i t  d r o p s  w i t h  a  r i s e  i n  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  t h i s  i n v e s t m e n t .  
S i n c e  ' 1 3  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  i n  k ,  y o u n g  a g e n t s  w h o  b e n e f i t  f r o m  i n v e s t i n g  i n  s k i l l  a c q u i s i t i o n  
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are necessarily those endowed with a level of physical capital higher than a threshold , k:, 
which characterizes an indifferent agent. The threshold salves equation {) (k, 8t, 7rt+t) = 
O. Using (1.5), we find k; to be: 
(1.6) 
Equation (1.6) calls for two remarks . First, in absence of any positive skill premium 
(if Wst+l = Wut+t), there does not exist a level of endowment such that education is 
worthwhile (k* ~ oo). Second, as the skill premium 7rt+ l b ecomes large, then k; ~ 
8 t/7rt+l , i. e. the threshold endowment of physical capital is approximately the inverse 
of a measure of the return to education. Let Rt denote this return: 
R - 7rt+l t---
Ot 
The threshold endowment of physical capital is thus approximately: 
all t . 
(1. 7) 
(1.8) 
Aside from the fact that it is very easy to interpret, this approximation is very u seful 
for the derivation of an analytical solution to our model. Since it is reasonable to think 
that 1r is large in developing countries in which skills are in short supply, we will use 
this approximation henceforth. 
The number of young agents who choose to work as unskilled labor is given by 
\Il (k;). As \Il (kr) ~ \Il (1/ Rt), the total number, nt, of young agents who will become 
skilled individuals in their second period of life is simply: 
(1.9) 
ali t = 0, 1, ... Given the properties of the function, \Il , it follows from (1.8) that any 
exogenous factor th.at raises the return to education tends to cause an increase in the 
proportion of young agents who choose to forgo unskilled-labor incarne in order to invest 
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in skill-enhancing education: 
However , in a general equilibrium, the return to education , Rt, will a lso adjust t o 
changes in nt, and we must t ake this into consideration when analyzing the effects of 
trade openness in this initially skill-scarce, agriculture-based economy. 
In period t , the total supply of skilled labor is the proportion of agents who chose to 
invest in skill- acquisition in period t- 1. In contrast , the total supply of unskilled labor 
in period t, is composed of two different generations of agents: old agents who did not 
att end school in period t- 1 (in total number 1- nt- d , and young agents who elect to 
work from period t on (in t ot al number 1 - nt) . Therefore, let ting T/it denote the total 
supply of labor of quality .i (i = s, u) in period t , we have: 
T/st 
T/ut 
t = 0, 1, 0000 
(1.10) 
(1.11) 
A structural transformation in this economy can thus b e cap tured by the law of 
motion for T/it, itself determined by the law of motion of n t. To further characterize 
these laws of m otion , we now explicitly model the supply side of the economy. 
1.2.2 Production and factor priees 
In this subsection , we describe the production technologies for a li goods produced in 
this economy. For convenience we temporarily drop the time subscript, except when 
absolutely necessary. 
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Production of the import-competing good 
Production of the import-competing good m requires physical capital (Km) and skilled 
labor (Sm) · Output in this sector is described by a standard Cobb Douglas t echnology: 
a E(0, 1) 
Profit-maximization by perfectly competitive firms leads to the following factor demand 
schedules: 
Wsm (1.12) 
(1.13) 
The research and extension services sector 
This sector produces research and extension services, using skilled labor only. 6 Workers 
in this sector are agronomists and/or agricultural t echnicians. They do research and 
t echnically assist farmers in raising on-farm productivity. The representative firm 's 
output, Yx, is given by: 
(1.14) 
Profit maximization in this nontradable sector leads to the following wage: 
Wsx = (1- a) Px (Sx)-a, (1.15) 
6 In our mode!, agricultural research and extension services are assumed to be privately provided. 
In areas dominated by commercial farming, private sector involvement in the provision of extension 
services seems to be a natural mechanism for addressing farmers' needs in ever-changing agro-ecological 
environments (World Bank, 1997). With the increased commercialisation of agriculture in many devel-
oping count ries, it seems therefore appropriate to assume a private provision of research and extension 
services. In practice, many developing count ries, often with the help of The World Bank, have created 
competitive priva te-sector networks of extension consultants to deliver inputs and technology to pri-
vate farmers (Schul tz et al. , 1996). Umali-Deininger (1996) also documents the involvement of private 
consulting firms in the provision of extension services in countries such as Argen t ina, Brazil , Colombia, 
Mexico, Uruguay, Korea, and Ta iwan. 
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where Px denotes the relative priee of extension services. Assurning skills are p erfectly 
transferable across sectors , the economy faces the following resource constraint in the 
skilled labor market : Sm + Sx :S 'f/s . 
The farming sector 
Research and extension services have b een an important input for agricultural devel-
opment in most developing countries (Evenson and Mwabu, 1998;' Evenson, Pray and 
Rosegrant , 1999; Evenson, 2001; Owens et al. 2003) , along with capital, land and labor . 
To keep the focus on the importance of research and extension services, we abstract 
away from land as an input into farming. Farrning in our mode! essentially requires 
the use of agricultural research and extension services, X , physical capital, K a, and 
unskilled labor, U . Adding land to such model would make the analysis more complex 
without qualitatively affecting the results. 
The production function we use is CES in capital and unskilled labor and Cobb 
Douglas in research and extension services. This production function captures two im-
portant features of agricultural production: the easy substitutability of physical capital 
and unskilled labor and their complementarity with agricultural research and extension 
services. 7 Production functions of this type are now commonly used in multifact or mo d-
els in which the elasticities of substitution may vary between pairs of factors. Fallon and 
Layard (1975) use a double CES form whereas Stokey (1996) , Greenwood and Seshadri 
(2002) , Krusell , Ohanian , Rfos-Rull and Violante (2000) and Maoz and Moav (2004) 
use a form d oser to ours . Agricultural output in our mode! is given by: 
(1.16) 
where x denotes the total supply of extension services, and <P (x) measures the t echnical 
progress on the productivity of physical capital brought about by overall agricultural 
7 The assumption of a strong substitutability of unskilled labor and capital is supported by a large 
body of empirical evidence surveyed in Hamermesh {1993). Evidence of a complementari ty between 
skills and capital in fa rming can also be found in Hamermesh (1993) . In manufacturing, the capital-skill 
complementa ri ty has been extensively documented since Grilicbes (1969) . 
-------------------------------
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research and extension services. The assumption of a capital augmenting technical · 
progress in the sense of Solow is a simplifying assumption to keep the analysis tractable. 
For simplicity also, we set: 
(1.17) 
In equilibrium, demand equals supply: X 
domestic market-clearing implies that: 
X. Since good X is nontradable, 
X=Yx. (1.18) 
Under perfect competition, profit-maximization leÇJ.ds to the following factor demand 
schedules: 
Px (1 -a) [ <P (X) ~a+ Ur 
a [<P (X) ~a+ U] o- 1 
a<P (X) [ <P (X) ~a+ U] o-1 
(1.19) 
(1.20) 
(1.21) 
Denoting by K the aggregate stock of physical capital, we can write the resource con-
straint in the capital market as follows: 
Ka+ Km ~ K , with K = la1 kdk . 
Since é E (0 , 1) , it is straightforward to show using (1.20) and (1.21) that growth in 
agricultural research and extension services will raise the marginal productivity of both 
physical capital and unskilled la bor, but the magnitude of this increase will be higher 
for physical capital, thus initiating the process of capital-augmenting technical change 
in agriculture. 
- - ---- - --- ---- ---------------
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1.3 Equilibrium effects 
In this section, we examine the effects of trade openness on the structure of the labor 
force, and their implicat ion for the development of the extension services sec tor. We 
begin by defining an equilibrium in the context of a small open economy. 
Definition 1.1: [Equilibrium] An intertemporal gen eral equilibriumfor this initially 
skill- scarce, agricultural, open economy is a sequence of priees, 
{P;t, T~t , r:nt , w~t , w;xt> w;mt} ~0 , a sequence of threshold physical capital endowments, 
{ k;} ~Û' a sequence of school-goers, { nn ~Û' a sequence of intersectoral allocation of 
inputs, {K~t, K:n_t , s;t , s :nt, Ut, Xt}~0 , a sequence of retums to education {R;}~0 , and 
a sequence of r elative supply of skilled and unskilled labor { 7J;t, 7J~t } ~0 , such that, for 
all t: 
( 1.15}, s:n_t satisfi es { 1.12), K~t satisfies { 1. 21), K:n_t satisfies ( 1.13), and Ut satisfies 
{1 .20 } ; 
( .. ) * * * d * * * 22 Wsxt =·wsmt = Wst an Tat = Tmt =Tt; 
{iii) given (K~t, Ut, X!) , P;t satisfies {1 .19}; 
{iv) given (Pm ,P.xt, 1J;t, 1J~t , 1J;t+ l > 77~t+l ' K), Rt satisfies {1.7}; 
{v) given kt, n; satisfi es 
(vi) given (Pm, 7J;t, 1J~t, 1J;t+l, 7J~t+l, K) , kt satisfies { 1. 8); 
{vii} 7J;t and 7J~t , satisfy 
(viii) all markets clear. 
(1.22) 
In a model like çmrs, the picture of the general equilibrium effe.cts of tra'cie openness 
can be quite blurry. To clarify this picture, we restrict attention to long-term effects by 
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emphasizing the economy's behavior along the steady state. 
D efinition 1.2: [Steady state equilibrium] A steady state equilibrium is a general 
equilibrium, which in addition satisfies nt = n;_ 1 = n*, for all t, where n* denotes the 
steady-state proportion of individuals who invest in skill acquisition. 
Combining the definition of a steady state equilibrium, with conditions (iv) and (vi) 
of a general equilibrium, it follows that 
n * = 1 - \Il ( k;) ( 1.23) 
which implies that k; = k* at the steady state. This in turn, implies that the retmn to 
education, R;, remains constant: Rt = R*. 
1.3.1 The determinants of the steady state return to education 
Next, we characterize the equilibrium retmn to education as defined in (1.7) at the 
steady state. Since capital maves freely across sectors , capital market clearing implies 
that the rentai rate of capital will be equalized across sectors: Ta= Tm= r. Intersectoral 
mobility of skilled labor also results in equal wages for this factor : Wsx = Wsm = w
5
. 
Lemma 1.1. The demand for skilled tabor in the nontradable sector is given by: 
( 1.24) 
where o = 1/a (1- a ) (1- ê) and A= (1- a)(l-a)<l. ( 1. 25) 
Proof: See appendix. • 
Since o > 0, Lemma 1.3.1 establishes that a rise (a decline) in the relative priee of the 
import-competing good causes the demand for skilled labor in the intermediate-good 
sector to decline ( rise): 
This is quite intuitive as both the import-competing and the research and extension 
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sectors have a competing d aim on the supply of skilled tabor. Our next step is to 
char acter ize the steady-state return to education, R* . 
The steady state opportunity cost of education, after substituting in (1.20) and 
(1.21) , is: 
* 1 () = cp(X) 
Combining (1.16) and (1.17) , using market-clearing conditions and substituting in (1.24) 
yields: 
(1.26) 
where J = 8t: (1- a ). For a small economy with initially a comparative advantage in 
the production of the agricultural good, trade openness (i.e., a decline in Pm) lowers the 
opportunity cost of education: 
ô()* 
-ô > 0. 
Pm 
This is because trade openness triggers a process of technological progress that r aises 
the importance of physical capital relative to unskilled labor in farrning. We see from 
(1.26) that growth in the economy-wide stock of physical capital has no effect on the 
opportunity cost of education. 
The next !emma characterizes the skill-premium, i.e. the skilled to unskilled labor 
wage ratio. 
Lemma 1.2. The s_teady-state skill-premium is: 
where À = (1 -a) Jï(l -a)E and v = 2/ Jï(l -a)ê. 
a 
Proof: See appendix. • 
(1.27) 
As can be seen from (1.27) , for a small economy with initially a comparative advan-
tage in the production of the agricultural good, the partial equilibrium effects of trade 
openness (i.e., a decline in Pm) on the skill-premium are unambiguously positive: 
Ô1f* 
-ô < 0, 
Pm 
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since b > O. In contrast, an exogenous increase in the supply of skilled labor, n*, tends 
to reduce this skill-premium: 
Ô1f* 
-ô < 0 . 
n * 
Furthermore, since 
Ô1f* 
ôK > O' 
growth in the stock of physical capital will tend to raise the skill-premium. This result 
follows from easy substitutability between physical capital and unskilled labor. Growth 
in the economy-wide stock of physical capital, by decreasing the cost of physical capital, 
induces the substitution of physical capital for unskilled labor in farming, thus causing 
the wage for unskilled labor to decline. Because growth in the demand for physical 
capital in farming raises the marginal productivity of agricultural research and extension 
services, demand for these services will rise, thus leading to an increase in the skilled 
labor wage, as supply adjusts to demand. Renee the increase in the skill-premium. 
Lemmas 1.3.1 and 1.3.1 together imply that the steady-state return to education 
can be written as: 
(1.28) 
where >. = >..iï(l-a)E . The partial equilibrium effects of trade openness on the return to 
education are straightforward. As cau be seen from (1.28) , the steady-state return to 
education tends to rise with trade openness (i .e., a decline in Pm): 
âR* 
-ô < 0 . 
Pm 
A rise in the economy's stock of physical capital, K , also positively affects the steady 
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state return to education: 
Renee, growth in the economy-wide stock of physical capital will raise the return to 
education. Indeed, it causes an increase in the 'skill-premium, without causing a decline 
in the opportunity cost of education. ·However, the return to education tends to decrease 
with an exogenous increase in the supply of skilled labor: 
8R* 
-a < O . 
n* 
Therefore since n* will adjust to changes in Pm, it follows that the general equilib-
rium effects of trade openness on the return to education are not clear-cut. They are 
the sum of two different effects: a direct effect (i .e., 8R* j8pm) and an indirect effcd 
([8R* j8n*] 8n* f8pm)- As the next subsection will show, the partial derivative of n* 
with respect to Pm is negative. The general equilibrium effects of trade openness on the 
return to education are therefore ambiguous. 
1.3.2 'l'rade openness and skill accumulation 
Our next task is to determine the long-term effects of trade openness on the supply 
of skilled labor for a small, agriculture-based economy. We start by establishing the 
existence and uniqueness of the steady state equilibrium. 
Using conditions (1.23) and (1.28), we obtain the following condition for the existence 
of a steady-state equilibrium: 
n = f (n ,pm, K) (1.29) 
where 
f (n,pm,K) = 1 - W 
Equation (1.29) is a well-defined fixed-point problem, owing to the properties of 
the function f . A number of observations can be made from equation (1.29). First , 
since the domain of the function W is bounded below by k = 0, then W (0) = 0, so 
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that f (0, Pm , K) = 1. This means that there does not exist a steady-state equilibrium 
without skilled labor. In other words, any steady state equilibrium of this economy 
satisfies n* > O. 
Moreover, we know that the poorest young agents in this economy, those with zero 
capital endowment , will necessarily choose to supply unskilled labor to firms. Renee ::1n 
equilibrium with no unskilled agents does not exist either. This can be confirmed by 
the fact that f (1, Pm , K) = 1 - W [ .>; - 1 ~m)26 ] < 1 as .>; - 1 ~m)26 > 0 . So any equilibrium 
of this economy satisfies 0 < n* < 1. 
Finally, as the function W is strictly increasing, by construction, f is strictly de-
creasing in n and Pm· In contrast, f is strictly increasing in the economy-wide stock of 
physical capital, K . Renee Brouwer 's fixed-point theorem may be applied to establish 
the existence of a steady state equilibrium: 
Proposition 1.1: There exists a unique n* E (0, 1) , such that n* = f (n* , pm , K) , 
and 
(i) ân* 0 Ô pm < 
(ii) ân* O. âK > 
Properties (i) and (ii) o~ Proposition 1.1 follow from a direct application of the 
Implicit function theorem. Property ( i ) states that in the long run, trade openness 
raises the supply of skilled labor in an initially skill-scarce agriculture-based country. 
This is the substance of a trade-induced structural transformation. A country's openness 
to trade initiates deep changes in the structure of the labor force with a drop in unskilled · 
labor ( easily replaced by physical capital) in farming. When this happens , the return 
to education rises, thus raising the number of individuals who benefit from investing in 
skill-enhancing education . 
Property (ii) states that an inflow of physical capital in the eco no my will increase the 
supply of skilled labor in the long run. · There are two underlying reasons for this result . 
First, because of the easy substitutability between physical capital and unskilled labor in 
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agriculture, an increase in the supply of physical capital causes a proportional decrease 
in the marginal productivity of each of the two inputs, thus leaving unchanged the 
opportunity cost of skill-investment. Second, because physical capital and agricultural 
research and extension services are complementary, a higher supply of physical capital 
increases the productivity of research and extension, thus leading to an increase in the 
market demand for these services. Since. the research and extension services sector is 
intensive in skilled labor, in the long run, the rise in the demand for these services will 
stimulate the demand for skills, thus raising the skill premium. 
Globalisation changes many aspects of life in a small, agriculture based society. 
Those who fear that taking part in world trade might exacerbate the scarcity of skilled 
labor in such country may find sorne hope in the teachings of this chapter. Trade does 
not move a poor country away from the economie progress associated with structural 
transformations. 
1.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter examines the forces underlying the structural transformation of a small 
economy with initially a comparative advantage in the production of agricultural com-
modities. To explore the nature of these forces, we use a three-sector intertemporal 
general equilibrium model, with two final goods and one intermediate, nontradable 
good. Our model identifies three main ingredients for a successful process of structural 
transformation. The first is the substitutability of physical capital for unskilled labor 
in far·ming. The second is a capital-augmenting process of technical change in farming 
induced by a greater availability of agricultural research and extension services. The 
third is trade openness itself, which, in the long-run, leads to an increase in the relative 
supply of ski lied la bor. 
Previous studies imply that this increase in the relative proportion of skilled indi-
viduals fails to benefit the export sector, which they model as unskilled-labor intensive 
( e.g. Cartiglia 1997). Our mo del reverses this prediction by modeling the farming sec-
tor explicitly and accounting for the complementarity between capital and research and 
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extension services (intensive in skills). This ensures that the export sector (i.e., the 
farrning sector) directly benefits from the trade-induced increase in the supply of skilled 
labor. The latter strengthens its international competitiveness. 
Our message to policy makers is two-fold. First, specialization in agriculture can be 
an engine of structural change if the barriers to quality educa tion are not too big. In 
this chapter , we have assumed that the cost of education is the opportunity cost for a 
young agent of not working. A trade-induced structural transformation will b e ail the 
more powerful if the government makes education one of its most important policies. 
The availability of affordable quality education is essential for the mechanics we have 
highlighted in this chapter to work. Second, trade may lead to a serious shrinking of 
the import competing sector. Our analysis suggests that protecting this uncompetitive 
sector against all odds may not be an effective way to stimulate the accumulation of 
human capital. 
Our message to ant i-trade activists is simple. Relax! Trade and the specialization 
it implies do not wipe out the hopes for poor countries to move away from poverty. On 
the contrary, trade can be an important engine of structural revolution. 
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1.5 Appendices 
Proof of Lemma 1: First , using (1.13) and (1.21), equal rentai rates in equilibrium 
imply: 
Pm [ q; (X) ; a+ uy-a = qy (X) ( ~=) 1-a (1.30) 
Second, using (1.12) and (1.15) , equal skilled-labor wages in equilibrium imply: 
(1.31) 
Third, combining (1.31) and (1.19) and rearranging terms yields: 
qy (X)Ka+U = ( )1/a (Km) s X 1 Pm Sm x, (1.32) 
with 
1 = (-1 )1/a 
1- a: (1.33) 
Finally, using (1.30) , (1.32) , (1.14) and (1.17) , as well as market-clearing conditions 
yields the result. • 
Proof of Lemma 2: We have 7rt = w8 t/Wut· Using (1.12) and (1.20) , we can write the 
steady-state skill-premium as follows: 
Substituting in (1.30) and rearranging terms yields: 
n* = 1- a: qy(X* ) (K:n) . 
a: s:n 
(1.34) 
The resource constraint implies K~ = K - K:n . Substituting t his expression in 
(1.32) , rearranging t erms yields: 
qy (X*) K~ + U* = [ ( )1 /a X* Bx S*] (K:n) 
X* 1 Pm qy(X*) + m s:n 
which implies that : 
K :n = cp (X*) K~ + U* [ ( )1 101. X * Sx + S* ] - 1 
s:n . X * 'Y Pm cp( X *) m 
Now, substitut ing (1.35) in (1.34) and rearranging terms yields: 
* 1 - a [ (cp(X*)K + U*] l 
7f = - a - 'Y (Pm)1/0I. [</Y (X*)r1 X *Sx + s:n . 
Using (1.17) and (1. 24) and market-clearing conditions, we find : 
7r* = 1- a [ (Pm/-S A (l-01.)c K + 2 (Pm )8 (1- n* ) ] 
a ('YA (1-0t.)( l -c) -1) A+ (p;, )8 n* ' 
where A = (1 - a ) (1-01.).l and 8 = 0€ (1 - a ). 
Using (1.25) and (1.33), it can be shown that: 
( 'YA(1-0t.)(1-c) -l) A= c ~a ) (1 - a ) 8(1-0t.). 
Therefore, for appropriately chosen a E (0, 1) and E: E (0 , 1), we can have: 
so that : 
where 
This completes the proof. • 
À . = 1 - a A (l -Ot.)c 
a 
1/ = 2A- (l -Ot.)c _ 
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(1.35) 
Chapter 2 
Democratie Voting and Social Exclusion 
ABSTRACT1 
This chapter explores the political determinants of societies' tolerance for social exclusion 
on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or race. We develop a political-economic mode! of 
social exclusion with three main features. First, each individuall!ving in this society must 
submit a political proposai regarding the extent to which society must tolerate social 
exclusion. Second, depending on the realized degree of society's tolerance for social 
exclusion, each population group comprising the society must decide on how much 
resource to expend in arder to exclude rival groups from, or include members of their 
group in, the public allocation of education resources. Third, allocation of resources to 
participation in the exclusion contest trades off private investment in child's human 
capital. To the extent that population size is, at !east initially, the only source of 
asymmetry between rival groups, our analysis suggests that the introduction of 
democratie voting may not be sufficient to save sinall, but visible, minorities from social 
exclusion. Only where this asymmetry is moderate, can the introduction of democratie 
voting suffice to eliminate social exclusion. 
2.1 Introduction 
In public discussions of the role of institutions in the process of development, the 
introduction of democratie voting is often seen as a panacea--a cure for ali social ills. Social 
1 Co-written with Sylvain Dessy 
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exclusion2 , however, is a problem faced by democracies and dictatorships alike [William 
Easterly and Ross Levine (1997; Alberto Alesina, William Easterly, and Reza Baqir 
(1999), Mark Gradst ein and Moshe Justman (2002)]. Considera socially heterogeneous 
country, where population groups are polarized along ethnie, religious or racial lines. 
Whether individuals comprising such a society will have equal access to the constituents 
of welfare, regardless of their population group of affiliation , may therefore depend on 
whether social exclusion is tolerated. A necessary condition for social exclusion to be 
tolerated is that politicians have ethnie, racial, or religious-based constituencies, which 
may lead to the exclusion of the politically dominated population groups from the con-
stituents of welfare. It is not therefore surprising that such exclusion has been shown to 
have a negative effect on economie growth [William Easterly and Ross Levine (1997) ; 
Mark Gradstein and Moshe Justman (2002)], and to lead to an unequal distribution 
of wealth across population groups [Mark Gradstein and Maurice Schiff (2006)]. Why 
is this phenomenon tolerated in .some societies? More importantly, if individuals com-
prising a socially heterogeneous society were to vote democratically on the extent to 
which their society must tolerate social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or 
race, what would be the outcome of this vote and why? Under what conditions does 
democratie voting eliminate social exclusion? These are the questions we address in 
this chapter . 
Basic economie theory of social exclusion or marginalization reveals that participat-
ing in the exclusion contest entails costs, not just benefits, to the participants [Mark 
Gradstein (2003) ; Jose G. Montalvoa, and Marta Reynal-Querol (2005)]. By backward 
induction , therefore, one would expect a population group to support tolerance of social 
marginalization of rival groups only if, for members of that group, the benefits of socially 
marginalizing others outweigh its costs. The costs of marginalizing others may take the 
form of resources - time and/ or mo ney, members of a population group must exp end 
in order to block rival groups' access to publicly provided resources such as health ser-
vices, education [e.g., Mark Gradstein (2003)], orto public goods [e.g., Alberto Alesina, 
2In this chapter social exclusion refers to the exclusion of riva l social groups from the constituents 
of welfare on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity, for example. Indicators of socia l exclusion relate 
to economie activity, employment, housing, health, and other factors. 
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William Easterly, and Reza Baqir (1999)] . The benefits may be measured , for instance, 
in terms of the share of existing public resources this group can capture for the exclu-
sive use of its members [e.g., Mark Gradstein (2003)] . In this chapter , we develop a 
political-economic madel of population groups competition for education resources with 
three main features. First, each individualliving in this society must submit a political 
proposai regarding the extent to which society must tolerate social exclusion. Second, 
depending on the realized degree of society's tolerance for social exclusion, each popula-
t ion group comprising the society must decide on how much resoùrces to expend in arder 
to exclude rival groups from public allocation of education resources. Third, a llocation 
of resources to participation in the exclusion contest trades off private investment in 
child 's human capital. 
Within each population group, members correctly anticipate that , if selected, their 
political proposai on the extent of society's tolerance for social exclusion will have an 
effect on the intensity of the exclusion contest. Therefore, we first characterize the out-
come of the exclusion contest as a Nash-Equilibrium of a non-cooperative game between 
r i.val groups, given the realized degree of tolerance for social exclusion. Depending upon 
his population group of affilia tion, and depending upon the outcome of the exclusion 
contest, each individual .then receives a payoff from living in a society with degree of 
tolerance, say 8, for social exclusion. In a political equilibrium with democratie voting 
over the level of 8, each individual then chooses the political proposai, 8, that maximizes 
this payoff. 
We use this political-economic framework to argue that in a context where individ-
uals are allowed to vote democratically on the ~xtent of society's tolerance for social 
exclusion, if populat ion groups are either symmetric in exclusion power-or, wh en they 
are asymmetric, the degree of inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is relatively 
moderate-, then no population group gains from supporting tolerance of social exclu-
sion. Only .in societies where the inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is sufficiently 
large, would the more powerful group gain from supporting tolerance of social exclu-
sion. The analysis therefore suggests that democratization in socially heterogeneous 
count ries, with relatively law level of population group asymmetry in exclusion power, 
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can be sufficient to elimina te social exclusion or marginalization. However , in societies 
' 
where such asymmetry is sufficiently large, the introduction of democratie voting may 
not be sufficient. In that context, a necessary and sufficient condition for social exclu-
sion to be eliminated is that the introduction of democratie voting be combined with 
an appropriately designed immigration policy that reduces the relative exclusion powe.r 
of the majority group. 
There is an extensive economies literature focusing on the effects of social hetero-
geneity on the basis of race (e.g., Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir and William Easterly 
(1999)], ethnicity and religion (e.g., William Easterly and Ross Levine (1997) ; Mark 
Gradstein and Moshe Justman (2002); Mark Gradstein (2003) ; Jose G . Montalvoa, and 
Marta Reynal-Querol (2005)]. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) show that racial het-
erogeneity has a negative effect on the provision of public goods in the United States. 
Easterly and Levine (1999) show that ethnie divisions have a negative impact on the 
economie growth of African countries, because of their association with low educational 
attainments. Gradstein and Justman (2002) find that decentralized and segregated 
education in which different population groups 3 separately run uncoordinated school 
systems has a negative effect on growth. In an empirical study of ethnolinguistic diver-
sity, Montalvoa and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue that ethnie (religious) polarization has 
a large, negative, effect on economie development, because it reduces investment while 
increasing government consumption and the probability of a civil conflict. 
The common point of contributiO:fiS in the above literàture is that they ail fo cus on 
the eff~cts of social marginalization, and not on its political determinants. A notable 
exception is Mark Gradstein (2003) and most recently Mark Gradstein and Maurice 
Schiff (2006). Gradstein (2003) studies the political determinants of social exclusion in 
the case of multiple groups differentiated by race, religion, or ethnicity. He finds that 
in the presence of within-group human capital spillovers, social exclusion may win the 
majority's support. 
It is important to note that in Mark Gradstein (2003), households do not explicitly 
have the option to supplement public education resources with private resources, so that 
3 In their case, ethnici ty and religion are candidate sources of population heterogeneity. 
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if parental altruism is sufficiently high, the benefits of exclusion-which include human 
capital spillovers between members of the majority-will always outweigh its costs. In 
our model, social exclusion can obtain as a political outcome despite the absence of 
human capital spillovers, as long as investment in a child's human capita l has both a 
public as well as a private component-which is empirically well documented [e.g Kremer 
and Chen (1999)). Therefore, while Gradstein (2003) emphasizes the presence ofwithin-
group human capital externalities as an essential determinant of political support for 
social exclusion in a democracy, we, in contrast, emphasize the trade off between the 
cost of excluding rival population groups and household private investment in offspring's 
human capital formation. The distinguishing feature of our model is that each household 
has the option to supplement public education resources with a private investment in his 
offspring human capital. This feature of our model formalizes the degree of inter-group 
asymmetry in exclusion power (as measured, for example, by the degree of asymmetry in 
population size) as an important deterinining factor of the positive association between 
democratie voting and political support for social exclusion. Indeed, for each population 
group , the per capita cost of exclusion is increasing in the relative size .of the rival 
group. We show that in that environment, social exclusion càn still obtain as a political 
outcome. 
Our research is more closely related to a recently published work by Mark Gradstein 
and Maurice Schiff (2006). Gradstein and Schiff (2006) build a model in which exclusion 
of the minority is the preferred strategy for the majority, and study conditions under 
which society can gradually progress towards social inclusion of the minority. Two 
main features distinguish our model from Gradstein and Schiff (2006) . First, in their 
model only members of the minority, excluded from sharing in on publicly financed 
education resources, privately invest in their offspring's human capital formation. This 
implies that for the majority, public education completely crowds out parental private 
contribution to a child's human capital formation. We relax this assumption in our 
model. Indeed , in our model, both the majority and the minority have the option to 
supplement public education with privat e investment in their offspring's human capital 
formation. Relaxing this assumption allows us to endogenize the threat of rebellion or 
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secession by the minority. 
Second, in Gradstein and Schiff (2006) , the credibility of threat of rebellion by the 
minority is exogenously given. When this threat is sufficiently credible, the majority 
withdraws its support for social exclusion, and inclusion of the minority takes place. 
Only when this threat is incredible can social exclusion obtain and persist as a polit-
ica! outcome. In Gradstein and Schiff (2006), and perhaps deliberately so, no explicit 
consideration is given to the determinants of the credibility of this threat . Suppose as 
in Gradstein and Schiff that the minority can threaten to secede if their offspring are 
not included in the public allocation of education resources. On one hand, one would 
expect the minority to take a collective act ion aimed at establishing the credibility of 
their threat of secession. For example, they can expend their own resources in order to 
gain internationallegitimacy for their secession project; or they may invest in gathering 
legal resources necessary to justify their right to self-determination.4 This, in turn, will 
raise the credibility of their threat of secession in the eyes of the majority group. On 
the other hand, anticipating such action by the minority, the majority group may, in 
.response, undertake a collective action aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the mi-
nority's secession project. They may, for example, finance diplomatie missions abroad 
aimed at exposing the flaws of the minority's secession project, which, in turn,· may 
reduce the threat of secession by the minority. This action and reaction process is best 
described, as we show in this chapter, as a non-cooperative secession or rebellion game. 
Exclusion of the minority will then obtain political support only if the majority has 
enough resources to undermine the credibility of rebellion or secession by the minority. 
Otherwise, social inclusion will take place. Unlike in Gradstein and Schiff (2006) , there-
fore, our model uncovers the determinants of the credibility of the minority's threat of 
secession . We model the economie gains from supporting social exclusion as the level 
of welfare attained by an individual living in a society that has a degree, o, of toler-
ance for social exclusion. We show that whether or not the majority gains economically 
by excluding the minority depends upon the extent of the majority's exclusion power-
4 This may include exposing internationally the human injustice or exploitation they face in the larger 
multi-ethnic, or multi-religious state. 
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including its ability to undermine the threat of rebellion by the minority. To the extent 
that population size is, a t least initially, the only source of asymmetry between rival 
groups, our analysis suggests that the introduction of democratie voting may not be 
sufficient to save small, but visible, minorities from social exclusion. This is because for 
very small minorities, the threat of secession or rebellion is not credible. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the madel. 
This model is solved in section 3. Finally section 4 provides concluding remarks. 
2.2 Madel 
Consider an economy in which individuals differ primarily with respect to their ethnicity, 
or race, or religion. The economy lasts for two periods. Households in this economy 
are each composed of an altruistic parent and a single child, who makes no decision. 
Households are divided into N population groups, indexed by j, where j = 1, ... , N, (N 
· 2: 2) . We denote as nj E (0 , 1) the relative size of population group j, with n 1 + n 2 + 
.... + nN = 1. 
To keep the focus on social heterogeneity on the basis of either ethnicity, race, or 
religion, assume agents are homogeneous within each population group. We denote 
as h} , the human capital level of an adult member of population group j. We take 
this human capital level as a proxy for her labor incarne. A child's only activity is 
to accumulate human capital, the level of which depends on the quality of education 
received . Investment in child's education has two sources: a private source and a public 
source. The level of parental investment in child 's education is denoted as eij, while 
the level of public investment in a child's human capital is denoted as Bij. Thus, the 
human capital level of a child whose parent i ( i E [0, nj]) belongs to population group 
j is given by: 
DE(0, 1) (2.1) 
where D denotes the exogenously given relative productivity of parental investment in 
child's education.5 Observe that since public investment in education substitutes for 
5 T he assumption of perfect substitution between the private and the public component of human 
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parental investment , such investment will not be socially desirable unless D < 1, i. e., 
the productivity of parental investment in child's education is lower than that of public 
investment in education. We motivate public investment in this environment by the 
assumption that D E (0, 1), so that public investment in education has the potential to 
enhance economie growth.6 
Public funds, 8, allocated to public investment in education are financed by an 
exogenously given income tax levied on all parents , at a proportional rate t E [0 , 1) . 
Assuming balanced government budget, the leve! of public funds allocated to public 
investment in education is given by 
(2.2) 
Again to keep the focus on social exclusion of rival population groups, let us normal-
ize household consumption to 0, so that each household's essential decision is restricted 
to investment in child education, so as to maxirnize the child's human capital. Assume 
population groups compete against one another for a larger share of public investment 
in education. Thus, following Mark Gradstein (2003), each population group j expends 
an amount Xj to finance a group-specifie collective effort to exclude rival population 
groups from, or including members of the group in, the allocation of public education 
resources. 7 We denote as 
(2.3) 
the share of these resources secured by members of population group j, wh en, as a 
capital investment is made without loss of generality. Imperfect substitution (a la Cobb Douglas) further 
complicates the exposition without any new qualitative insight. Furthermore, the assumption of perfect 
substitution between human capital inputs is not restricted to our analysis. A similar assumption is 
made by Gary S Becker, Kevin Murphy, and Robert Tamura [1990]. 
6T his assumption is particularly relevant when one includes respect for the rule of law and for national 
insti tutions as a constituent of human capital. Marc Gradstein and Moshe Justman [2002] argue that 
public investment in education is better than private investment in enhancing the accumulation of these 
important constituents of individual human capital. 
71n the case of a majority group (M) and a minority group (m), one can think of Xm for examp!e, 
as resource expended by the rrùnority in order to increase the credibility of their of rebellion if they are 
excluded by the majority. And one can think of XM as the leve! of resource expended by the majority 
in order to undermine the credibility of the minority's threat of rebellion. 
39 
group, they allocate an amount Xj to exclude their rivals from the allocation of publicly 
provided education resources, where b E [0 , 1] is an endogenous measure of the degree 
of competit ion between population groups comprising the society and 
N 
R = L (xj )5 ni: 
j=l 
(2.4) 
As in Esteban and Ray [1999], R is interpreted here as a measure of the intensity of the 
inter-ethnie competition for public educational resources. Given aj, the share of total 
public resources secured by population group j for its members' use is 
(2.5) 
so that public education resources received by a child i born of a parent who belongs 
to population group j are given by 
e .. - aje t) - ) 
nj (2.6) 
ali i E [0 , nj], and all j (j = 1, .... , N). In a society where population groups are 
segregated, for example, by place of residence, the share, Bij, may be interpreted as 
the relative quality of public schools attended by children whose parents belong to 
population group j. 
Assume no free-riding within members of the same population group, so that total 
lobbying exp enditures by ethnie group j are equally shared by all group members. Thus, 
the budget constraint faced by the representative member of population group j is given 
by the following inequality: 
(2.7) 
ali i and all j. 
Given the amount, (nj)-1 Xj, contributed to collective action by population group 
j to exclude rival groups from sharing in on publicly provided education resources, the 
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objective of each parent i , member of population group j, is to choose eij so as to solve 
the following problem: 
subject to (2.1) , (2.6) , and (2.7) . Since parents are homogeneous within each population 
group j, it is clear that they will all choose the same leve! of parental investment in 
child 's education, so that eij = ej, all i. Therefore, since a child 's human capital 
leve! is strictly increasing in the amount of public education resources received, clearly 
the budget constraint will be satisfied with equality. Consequently, for each population 
group j, participation in the exclusion contest is characterized by the following equation 
x · = (1- t) n h1 - e ·n · J J J J J l (2.8) 
all j . Hence the trade off in each child's human capital between the cost, x1, of ex-
cluding rival population groups' children and parental investment in own offspring's 
human capital. Thus, the representative parent 's choice of ej determines the extent to 
which population group j participates in the exclusion contest. We characterize the 
determinants of this participation below. 
2.3 Winners and Lasers In the Exclusion Contest 
In this subsection we characterize the exclusion contest involving the representative 
members of each of the N population groups comprising the society. Since there is no 
free-riding between same-group individuals, the exclusion contest will essentially pit the 
representative members of each of the population groups comprising the society. In what 
follows, we study the outcome of this contest as a Nash-equilibrium of a non-cooperative 
game between t he respective representative members. 
Denote as player j , the representative member of population group j ( with j ,= 
1, .. .. N). Let Ej C ~+, denotes the strategy set of player j, with generic element ej. 
Let E = E1 x E2 x ..... x EN denotes the space of aU feasible strategy profiles, with 
generic element e. Define a real-valued function VJ : E -+ ~ by Wj = VJ (e), where 
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Wj denotes the payoff to player j when the strate gy profile e = ( ej, e-j ) is played , and 
e_j denotes the strategy profile chosen by the aggregate all players other than player 
j. From equation (2.1), substituting in (2 .3)-(2.6), and (2.8) , rearranging ter ms , yields 
· player j's payoff function as follows : 
(2.9) 
all j, where 
Wj = ( 1 - t) h} , (2.10) 
and e is as defined in (2.2) . Given e_j, player j' s best response satisfies the following 
equation 
""""' (w · - e )8 (n )1 +8 •e 
D=(w · - e· )8-l(n ·)l+8 LAh 1 t t ::.___ _ 
1 1 1 [ N 8 1+8] 2 n . Lt=l (wj - et) (nt) 1 (2.11) 
To solve for the Nash equilibria of this game, we consider two cases: a benchmark case 
where ail population groups are symmetric and another one where this assumption is 
relaxed. 
2.3.1 Exclusion Contest with Symmetric Exclusion Power 
In this subsection, we begin by characterizing the growth effect of social exclusion by 
solving a benchmark mo del where all population groups have equal size (i .e., nj = n 
all j) and equal initial wealth (i.e., h} = h1, all j). This implies that all population 
groups have identical exclusion power. We then investigate, in that context, whether 
democratie voting can generate social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity as a political 
outcome. The assumption of ethnie symmetry allows us to take full advantage of the 
computational simplicity of symmetric non-cooperative games. Renee the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2.1: Suppose nj = n and h} = h1 , all j. Then, the Nash~equilibrium 
- - - - - ---------- -- - - - ------
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profile, e* = ( ei , .. . , ejV) , is given by 
all j. 
Pro of: A symmetric Nash equilibrium is one where ej = e1, all l =/=- j . From 
(2.11) , substituting ej = e1 rearranging terms, we can rewrite the first order conditiun 
as follows: 
D _ (N- 1) oB 
- N[(1-t)hl- ej]' 
where B = th1 . Hence the result. • 
As an implication of the above proposition, the equilibrium income of a child when 
adult can be rewritten as follows : 
- N 
all j. Let hr = Lj=l njhj denotes the T- generation's average wealth level, TE {1 , 2}. 
Using the assumption of population group symmetry, the gross rate of economie growth 
in this economy with social exclusion is thus given by 
_ h2 _ ( 1 ) D [N- (N- 1) o] g-~- -t + t hl N (2.12) 
since, by symmetry, 'fir = hr all T = 1, 2. 
A number of observations can be derived from the growth rate expression (2.12) . 
First , social heterogeneity (i.e., N > 1) has a negative effect on the economie growth of 
a society that tolerates social exclusion (i.e., a society where o > 0) . Renee the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 2.2: Suppos e nj = n and h} = h1, all j . Then, in an ethnically 
diverse economy (i. e., N > 1), growth is smaller, the higher the degree, o, of society 's 
tolerance for social exclusion. 
Second, if 5 is suffi.ciently high, then an increase in the level of the tax rate financing 
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public investment in education can actually reduce the growth rate of the economy. 
Renee the following proposition: 
Proposition 2.3: Let nj = n and h} = h 1, all j, and suppose the triplet ( o, D, N) satisfies 
(1-D)N &< 1 N-1 < - ' 
then, public investment in education hinders economie growth. 
Proof: It suffices to show that 
ôg 
ôt < o, 
(2.13) 
whenever condition (2.13) holds. This result is obtained by simply differentiating ex-
pression (2.12) with respect to t. • 
Since D E (0 , 1) , condition (2.13) can easily obtain in sufficiently heterogeneous 
societies. In particular, as N --+ oo, this condition converges to 1 - D < o :=; 1, 
with D E (0, 1). The result in Proposition 2.3 reflects the substitutability b etween 
public and private investment in a child's human capital. ·The results of propositions 
2.2 and 2.3 together suggest that tolerating social exclusion can be costly to a society. 
First, tolerance of social exclusion slows clown growth (Proposition 2. 2) . Second, if su ch 
tolerance is sufficiently high, it can even cause public investment in education to become 
unproductive in a society with a high degree of heterogeneity (Proposition 2.3). If so, 
why would ethnically diverse societies tolerate it ? 
Observe that in this benchmark economy studied above, the equilibrium payoff to 
participating in the exclusion contest is identical across population groups, and given 
by 
all j. Therefore, in a political equilibrium with democratie voting over the level of o, it 
is clear that social exclusion will be rejected in favor of social cohesion, sin ce for all j , 
0 = argmaxïfJ (o). 
0 
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In this benchmark case, all population groups understand that there will be no winner in 
the exclusion contest, as in a democracy they ail have equallobbying strength reflected 
by equal size and equal economie power. In what follows, we ask whether these results 
extent to the case of asymmetric population groups. 
2.3.;2 Asymmetry in Exclusion Power 
In t his subsection, we relax the assumption of symrnetry in exclusion power as captured 
by t he group size, and attempt to solve for Nash-equilibria of the social exclusion game. 
The goal of this exercise is to identify the sources (if any) of political tolerance for 
social exclusion. In the interest of simplicity we restrict attention to two population 
groups, denoted group M (i .e., the majority group) and group m (i.e., the minority), 
respectively, with nm < nM . In other words, N = 2. For simplicity, we let h1 = hj , 
all j, so that differences in group size also captures difference in lobbying power. In 
that context , using (2.9), it can b e shown that a Nash-equilibrium profile satisfies the 
f0llowing system of two equations in two unknown ( em, eM ) 
m 
(w- em )0 (nm)l+o (w- eM)0 (nM)l+o o() 
_.:....._ _ __:___:____.:. _ _:__----=...c...:.._.:.......:....:....:...__--n
2 
= (w- em) nm (2.14) [Cw- em)5 (nm)l+o + (w- eM)0 (nM)l+5] D 
(w- em )0 (nm)l+o (w- eM)0 (nM)l+O o() 
--'------'----'----'---'----'--..:__--'-----,.2 = ( w - e M) n M ( 2.15) [Cw- em )5 (nm)l+o + (w- eM )0 (nM)l+5] D M 
where w is as defined in (2 .10), () is as defined in (2.2) , and nm + nM = 1. Combining 
the above first order conditions yields the following arbitrage condition: 
(2 .16) 
Observe that a direct implication of Eq. (2.16) is that as long as population groups have 
different sizes, i.e. nm =1 nM, all Nash-equilibria are asymmetric in players' strategies: 
ej =1 e_j, all j. hence the following Lemma: 
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Lemma 2.1 The unique Nash-equilibrium of this ·exclusion game is given by 
(2.17) 
for all j = m , M . 
Proof: Equation (2.16) implies that 
Substituting this back into (2.15), rearranging terrns then yields the result . • 
Consider expression (2 .8) . Substituting in (2.17) yields, for a typical member of 
population group j, her per capita investment, xj = xj /nj, in the exclusion contest as 
follows: 
(2 .18) 
ThEm, observe that in comparison to the ethnie majority, members of the ethnie rninority 
invest more resources per capita in the exclusion contest: 
due to the asymmetry in exclusion power (i .e., nM > nm) · In other words, to avoid 
being totally excluded from the allocation of public education resources, members of 
the ethnie mi_nority must allocate relatively more resources per capita in the exclusion 
contest. As a result , they end up each diverting more resources away from private 
investment in their offspring's human capital: 
This result is a direct implication of the power asyrnmetry (i.e,, nM > nm) between 
the two population groups comprising the society. We have just proved the following 
Proposition: 
---~ ----
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Proposition 2.4: Tolerance of social exclusion in a context of population group 
asymmetry in exclusion power forces m embers of the ethnie minority to waste relatively 
more resources, at the expense of their offspring 's human capital. 
How wasteful tolerance of social exclusion will force members of the ethnie minority 
to b e, depends on the extent of the asymmetry in exclusion power between the two pop- · 
ulat ion groups. We distinguish two cases: (i) nM < w D jMJ; (ii) nM ~ w DjfJB. In the 
first case, the asymmetry in exclusion power is mo derate, · in the sense that each mem-
ber of the minority group can still privately invest in his offspring's education despite 
participation in the exclusion contest: em > O. In the second case, the asymmetry in ex-
clusion power is sufficiently large, in the sense that participation in the exclusion contest 
precludes private investment in education for members of ethnie minority: em = O. 
Case 1: nM < wDjfJe 
In this subsection, we address the issue of who gains from supporting social exclusion 
wh en the inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is not too large: nM < w D / fJB . 
We first characterize population groups' equilibrium payoffs from participating in the 
exclusion contest. 
Lemma 2.2: Let h~ = h;,_ . Suppose nM < wDjfJB . Then, the equilibrium payoff 
accrued to the representative m ember of ethnie j is given by: 
vi (fJ) = D w + [1- n_jfJ] e, (2.19) 
all j = m,M .. 
Proof: Under the condition nM < w D jfJe, it can be shown that both population 
groups invest privately in their offspring's education in order to supplement publicly 
provided education resources. Thus, from (2.9) substituting in (2. 17) , rearranging terms 
yields the result. • 
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A number of observations can be derived from Eq. (2.19) . First , the majority group 
is the contest winner: 
for ali 8, 
The second observation is summarized by the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.5 : Suppose nm < nM < wDjMJ. Then neither the minority group 
nor the majority benefit from supporting tolerance for social exclusion. 
Proof: It suffices to show that for all j = m, M, 
0 = argmaxVi (8) . 
8 
This can be done by observing from (2.19) that the function Vi( .) i~ strictly decreasing 
for all j = m, M . Renee the result. • 
That this result hold for the ethnie minority is straightforward because tolerance 
of social exclusion causes members of that group to become relatively more resource-
wasteful, which , by backward induction, leads them to propose a zero-tolerance policy 
for this phenomenon. For this result to hold for the contest winner as weil, is less 
straightforward. Yet the reason the majority group also rejects social exclusion is quite 
intuitive. Excluding the minority group from sharing in on public resources entails both 
costs (wasted resources) and benefits measured by the share ofresources captured by the 
group. Wh en the inter-group asymmetry is mo derate in the sense that nM < wD /88 , 
this reduces the benefit the majority derives from excluding the minority from the 
allocation of public education resources. As a result, the costs of excluding the ethnie 
minority continue to outweigh the benefit of doing so, hence their lack of support for 
social exclusion. The above Proposition implies that in societies where the inter-group 
asymmetry in exclusion power is moderate enough, the presence of social exclusion may 
reflect the absence of democracy. 
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Case 2: nM ~ w D /88 > nm 
In this subsection, we revisit the issue of who gains from supporting social exclusion 
in the case where the inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is relatively large: 
nM ~ w D/88. In that case, the asymmetry in exclusion power is such that participating 
in the exclusion contest forces the minority group to give up on supplementing public 
resom ces with private investment in child 's human capital. In other words, em = 0, 
while eM > O. We begin with the following lemma. 
Lemma 2.3: Let h~4 = h~ . Suppose 
(2.20) 
Then, the equilibrium payoff accrued to each m ember of ethnie group j is given 
by: 
where 
. { 8/[nm+1J(8)nM] forj = m 
V *1 (8) = , 
D w + 1/J (8) 8for j = M 
q; ( 8) 
1/J ( 8) 
[ 
8tnM ] 15 
(1 - t) D 
1 
nM + [1; (8)]-1 nm- nm8· 
(2.21) 
(2.22) 
(2.23) 
Pro of: The result sim ply follows from substituting expressions (2 .17) into (2 .9) , 
using condition (2.20) , and rearranging terms. • 
Expression (2.21) characterizes each population group's payoff from living in a so-
ciety that has a degree, 8, of tolerance for social exclusion. In arder to understand 
who gains and who loses from supporting social exclusion, we again ask each individ-
ual to make a proposai on the level that 8 should take in the society. Our results are 
summarized by the following Proposition: 
Proposition 2.6: Let h~ = h~. Suppose nM ~ wD/88 > nm . Then, only the 
majority group gains from supporting social exclusion. 
- - - - - - - - - - -------
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Proof: It suffices to show that the function V*m (.) is strictly decreasing in <5 , while 
V*M (.) is strictly increasing in <5. • 
Claim 1: V*m (.) is a strictly decreasing function. 
Pro of of Claim 1: To show that V*m ( .) is a strictly decreasing function, it suffi ces 
to show that </J ( . ) is a strictly increasing function, i.e., <P' (<5) > O. To see this, let 
<p ( <5) = log <P ( <5) ,where <P ( <5) is as defined in (2 .22) . Th en, it can be shown that 
, [ <StnM ] . 
<p (<5) = 1 +log (1 _ t) D > 0, smce nM ~ wD/<50. 
Hence </J' ( <5) = <p1 ( <5) </J ( <5) > 0. This completes the pro of. • 
Claim 2: V*M (.) is a strictly increasing fun ction. 
Proof of Claim 2: The proof follows in two steps. First, we establish analytically 
that V*M (.) is at least non-decreasing in <5 . Then we show numerically that V*M (.) is 
indeed strictly increasing in <5. 8 
Differentiate (2.23) with respect to <5 to get 
Next , to show that 'l/J' (<5) > 0, it suffices to establish that 
Since by construction cf/ (5) = <p1 (5) </J (5), the above inequality reduces to 
(2.24) 
Now, suppose by way of contradiction that inequality (2.24) do.es not hold for nM > 
wD /80. Then, observe that as nM --+ wD/<50, it is clear that </J (5) --+ 1, so that 
8T he fact that the payoff function can be iilcreasing for sorne reasonable values of 8 is enough to 
make our point since this shows that. there are situations where the majority group is better off if the 
society's tolerance for social exclusion is high. One would therefore expect this group to vote for a high 
8-society . 
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[ 1 + ~ log </J ( 8)] </J ( 8) -t 1, 
which is clearly a contradiction. 
Next, we solve two numerical examples to illustrate that V (.) is strictly increasing 
in 8. 
In Figure 2-a at the end of this chapter, the tax rate is chosen at t = .15, which set 
nM = .90, in arder for condition (2.20) to be satisfied. In Figure 2-b , the tax rate is 
raised at t = .20, which set nM = .75 in order for condition (2.20) to hold. In both cases, 
the value function V *M (.) is strictly increasing for values of 8 chosen in the interval 
[.65 , 1] . Values of 8 < .65 are inconsistent with condition (2.20) . Renee the result . • 
Condition (2.20) states that the majority group's relative population size is suffi.-
ciently large. It implies that for the majority population group, the benefits of excluding 
the rival group exceed its costs, while the reverse is true for the minority group. As a 
result , only the former gains from supporting society's tolerance for social exclusion. In 
such a society, therefore, one would expect political candidates to have ethnie, religious 
or racial-based constituencies, and social exclusion will thrive under democratie voting. 
Our analysis replicates Gradstein 's (2003) result only in cases where inter-group asym-
metry in exclusion power is suffi.ciently large. So when population groups have equal 
size, or when the asyrnmetry in sizes is not too large, democratie voting can eliminate 
social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or race. This is because in that case, 
all population groups anticipate that the intensity of exclusion contest will be too high, 
so that the costs of excluding rival population groups will exceed its benefits. However , 
when the inter-group size asymmetry is suffi.ciently large, then democratie voting can 
yield political support for social exclusion. This is because for members of the majority, 
the per capita cost of excluding the minority group is smaller , the smaller the relative 
population size of the minority. In order words, the higher (respectively, the smaller) the 
size of the majority (respectively, the minority), the more able (respectively, less able) 
will each of its members be to supplement public investment by private investment . 
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For members of the majority, this will raise the benefits of exclusion, while lowering its 
costs. Renee the majority's political support for society's tolerance of social exclusion, 
in a democratie environment. 
2.4 Concluding R emarks 
This essay seeks to contribute to the understanding of the political determinants of 
societies tolerance for social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or race. We 
developed a political-economic madel where society's degree of tolerance for social ex-
clusion obtains as a political equilibrium under democratie voting. Echoing the existing 
economies literature on t he effects of social exclusion, we find that indeed social exclu-
sion is harmful to growth . On the issue of whether democratie voting can support the 
emergence of social exclusion as a political equilibrium, we find two types of answers 
depending on the context. More specifically, we find that in a context where eth-
nic, religious, or racial groups are either symmetric in exclusion power-or, when they 
are asymmetric, the degree of inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is relatively 
moderate-, then no group gains from supporting tolerance of social exclusion . Only in 
societies where the inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is sufficiently large, would 
the more powerful group gain from supporting tolerance of social exclusion. Our anal-
ysis therefore suggests that while democratie voting in ethnically diverse societies with 
relatively low level of population group asymmetry in exclusion power can be· sufficient 
to elirninate social exclusion, it may, in contrast, actually generate social exclusion as 
a political outcome in societies where the inter-group asymmetry in exclusion power is 
sufficiently large. 
Another important result of this chapter is that the majority's political support 
for social exclusion is increasing in its exclusion power. This exclusion power, in turn, 
is deterrnined by the relative size of the minority, as the latter affects the cost to the 
majority of excluding the rÙinority. Our analysis therefore suggests that an immigration 
policy aimed at reducing the majority's exclusion power combines with the introduction 
of democratie voting to represent an effective weapon against social exclusion. 
- -- - - - ---- ---- ----
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These results where obtained in a framework where investment in child 's human 
capital has two perfectly substitutable components: a private component controlled 
by the parent and a public component controlled by a government endowed with the 
power of t axation. This double sourcing of human capital inputs was the dist inguishing 
feature of our model. With respect to Mark Gradstein (2003), this double sourcing 
allowed us to obtain persistence of social exclusion without appealing to within group 
human capital spillovers. With resp ect to Mark Gradstein and Maurice Schiff (2006) , 
this double sourcing .allowed us to endogenize the credibility of· the threat of rebellion 
by the minority. Because of our focus on endogenizing the costs and benefits of social 
exclusion, we restricted attent ion to a case where the exclusion power of the majori ty 
is determined solely by its size. Consideration of income or wealth asymmetry either as 
an alternative source of exclusion power or as an important component of that power, 
in our opinion, would add no new qualitative insights to the analysis. 
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Chapter 3 
The Economies of Child Trafficking 
ABSTRACT1 
The trafficking of children is a thriving business. In this chaprer, we highlight key 
economie characteristics of this business. W e show that the fight against chi Id trafficking 
is far from trivial and that supply-side policies have very limited effect unless preceded 
by attacks on the demand side. Successful policies involve international cooperation on 
both fronts. We work within a mode! of a source country to highlight the riecessary 
ingredients of a successful international cooperation towards the elimination of child 
trafficking. 
3.1 Introduction 
The trafficking of children is a thriving business.2 According to the International 
Labor Organization (lLO), in 2002, more than 1.2 million children were trafficked in the 
world (ILO-IPEC- 2002). One would think that a business of such scale should be easy to 
regulate. The fight against child trafficking, however, is far from trivial. To succeed in 
this fight, it is crucial to understand sorne important aspects of the business at hand. 
1 Co-written with Stephane Pallage and Sylvain Dessy 
2 The United Nations' 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines 
child trafficking as " the recruitrnent, transportation, trans fer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means 
of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of abuse of . 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve 
the consent of a persan having control over another persan, for the purpose of exploitation." 
-- - - ---- - - - --- ----- ----- - ------
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Children are trafficked away for several purposes. Sorne end up working as modern 
slaves in plantations or factories, sorne wind up on the sex market , sorne others find 
themselves as child soldiers on the frontline of a conflict foreign to them. There may 
be severa! market segments, depending on the purpose·, but they all share key economie 
characteristics. 
First, and foremost, each market is an international market with an international 
priee. Well-meaning individual efforts by sorne governments may thus not be very 
meaningful in the end. Worse, as we show in this chapter, such individual efforts may be 
counter-productive for the global fight against child trafficking. Second, the trafficking 
of children obeys the laws of supply and demand. A rise in the priee of children at tracts 
new traffickers on the market , while a drop in the priee makes children affordable Lo 
a wider audience. Third , traffickers prey on children who are most vulnerable, either 
because parental supervision is lacking or because parents are excessively credulous, 
to t he point of confiding their children to the care of well-speaking stl·angers. There 
are two ways of protecting children. On the one hand, parents may invest time and 
energy in the supervision of their children. On the other hand, governments may invest 
in the education of parents or in public protection mechanisms to supplement parental 
supervision. Both types of protections entail a cost. Fourth, this cost of protecting 
children is an increasing function of the number of traffickers. Fifth, the success of 
traffickers is a decreasing function of the priva te ·and public investments in the protection 
of children. Last but not least, child traffickers operate in well organized rings and follow 
a basic standard in organized crime: competition is bad for business . While there is not 
much evidence on the actual degree of competition between traffi ckers, tacit collusion 
is the only way such rings could have had the time to establish themselves and reach 
their level of proficiency. Their trade is well functioning, so well indeed that traffickers, 
for example, rarely smuggle children across borders: they are often equipped with false 
passports and the tools to bribe officiais when needed. The rings need not be large 
but they involve at least a few people in different countries (see Dottridge, 2004 for an 
excellent description of the trade) .3 
3 While the characteristics of this business .apply to human trafficking markets in general, we focus 
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An understanding of those principle.s leads to the following importa nt remarks. Ce-
teris paribus, if a country invésts in the protection of its children and succeeds in the 
fight of traffickers at home, this t ends to drive the international priee of children upward , 
which is likely to make it more costly for other countries to provide similar protection 
for their children. One's efforts to fight trafficking in one's own backyard de facto exert 
a negative externality on the rest of the world. Clearly, rich countries have taken the 
lead in the protection of their children, which has strong implications on the structure 
of t he market: It implies that most of the supply originates from poor countries, but 
also that most of the demand originates from individuals of richer countries. Indeed, 
by making it more costly for poor countries to protect their children, it makes poor 
children even more vulnerable to traffickers. By establishing the market priee at a rela-
tively high level, it also makes children a commodity affordable primarily to the wealthy. 
This polarization of the market can be explained at least partly by the leading role rich 
countries have assumed in the ILO-IPEC crusade against trafficking. 
Child trafficking therefore appears to be very hard to combat. A winning strategy 
would imply a move from mere myopie supply-side policies to a more complex policy 
intervention. The fust step would involve a simultaneous, coordinated attack by all 
destination countries on the demand side of the market. The second step would require 
a similar coordination on the supply-side. The first step, however, is not easy to achieve. 
Because the demand originates from richer countries who have secured the protection 
of their children by supply-side policies, a significant part of the responsibility for the 
elimination of child trafficking lies in the hands of the latter, while victirns originate 
from poorer countries. The sense of altruism of rich countries will thus be put to the 
test. 
Our purpose, in this chapter, is to emphasize the fundamental economies of child 
trafficking in a way that may help guide po licy makers in this highly important matter . 
on child trafficking because of the special vulnerability of children to traffickers . 
L __ 
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3.1.1 The facts 
International consensus - In most countries, human trafficking is acknowledged as a se-
rious crime, punishable by law. Yet, owing to dramatic improvements in transportation 
and communication technologies, child trafficking has developed into a transnational 
crime, and appears to be on t he rise worldwide. The ILO-IPEC (2001) , the UNICEF 
(2002) and the US-st ate-department (20 03) have ali pulled the alarm warning about 
i~s growing scope and its transnational complexity. The interna tional community's 
response to the transnational nature of the phenomenon resulted in a series of interna-
tional conventions: the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 
Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 
and Convention C1 82 by the lLO (1999) . All efforts made so far to fight child t raf-
ficking are laudable. They typically stress the need for international cooperation. This 
chapter may help guide policy makers on the desirable form of such cooperation and 
· sequence of policy action. 
Some statistics - Trafficked children flow from poorer to richer countries. The UNICEF's 
international flow chart summarized in Table 3.1 indeed suggests that receiving coun-
tries are all wealthier on a per capita basis than source count ries. In West and Central 
Africa, for example, children from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Togo are trafficked 
to the relatively richer Cameroon, Côte d 'Ivoire, Gabon and Nigeria. In South Asia, 
Nepal acts as a source-country for India, with a per capita GDP ofroughly twice that of 
Nepal. For this region , the Committee on the Rights of the Child reports that in 1995 an 
estimated 100,000 to 150,000 Nepalese girls and women had been trafficked into India 
for sexual exploitation. In South-East Asia, Thailand is reported to be the main receiv-
ing country, with an estimated 194,180 foreign child laborers reported in 1996, mostly 
from Cambodia, China (particularly from the Yunnan Province) , Lao PDR, Myanmar 
and Vietnam, all of which are poorer relatively to Thailand. Clearly final users may not 
necessarily be from the receiving countries. Y et the fl.ows indicate a relative polarization 
of the market . 
As is. also clear from Table 3.1 and Figure 3.a, the richest countries are important 
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destination countries. Examples include, Australia, Canada, Germany, Greece, J apan, 
the Netherlands, the United States. None of them is reported as a significant source 
country. 
3.1.2 This chapter 
This chapter develops a model in which the supply of trafficked children arises en-
dogenously. In our model, children are kidnapped from a source-country, and illegally 
shipped into the rest of the world for profit. Children's protection from potential traf-
fickers involves both the family - acting as a private protective unit through parental 
investment in child protection - , and a government, which allocates public expenditures 
to improve enforcement of laws against child trafficking. The supply of child trafficking 
emerges if and only if a positive fraction of the economy's entrepreneurs find it opti-
mal to invest their capital in breaking clown protective barriers against child trafficking 
set up by both families and the local government, given the state of the international 
demand for children. 
We use this model to study the determinants of the ability of a source-country 
government, acting unilaterally, to curb the supply of trafficked children. We highlight 
the negative externality exerted by foreign countries' efforts to fight trafficking at home 
on our model economy, and the key role this externality plays ou the p,olarization of the 
market observed in the data. 
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that since by nature, children 
are most vulnerable when left unprotected, building a protective environment for these 
children requires both parental and public investments. Parents are usually called upon 
to provide for their children's basic needs·, including nutrition, adequate clothing, health, 
and education, which may reduce the risk for these children of being lured by the false 
' 
promises of better lives outside their home environment. However, for many reasons 
that include poverty, families often fail to be effective protective units for their children, 
thus making them the perfect victims for traffickers. To help protect children from 
traffickers, government officiais may launch public awareness campaigns, in addition to 
60 
the recruiting, training, and equipping of customs officiais, police officers, and other 
law-enforcers. 
Notwithstanding the above, even well-intentioned government officiais may fail to 
prevent children from being trafficked away if, when acting unilaterally, they are un-
able to affect the international priee for trafficked children. The higher this priee, the 
higher the return to creating a supply of trafficked children, which, in turn, may in-
duce well-organized criminal groups to step up the effort to break clown barriers against 
child trafficking. In other words, a high international priee acts as a "lad der ," helping 
well-organized criminal groups to climb up the protective walls set up by families and 
government officiais. The critical law-enforcement effort is therefore one that raises the 
wall higher than the lad der. The higher the lad der , the higher the wall should be, and 
thus the more public funds will be needed . 
The rest of the chapter is presented as follows . Section 2 offers a brief literature 
review. Section 3 presents the model and its solution. Section 4 concludes. 
3.2 Literature review 
The lLO classifies child trafficking as one of the worst forms of child labor, und er Conven-
tion C182. Due to the outrageous nature of this phenomenon, an international consensus 
has developed on its elimination, often prompting policy actions, which, unfortunately, 
preceded research by many years. Swinnerton and Rogers (2005) and Dessy and Pallage 
(2005) are the fust papers to attempt a theoretical exploration of the economies of this 
phenomenon. 
Using a mode! of parental investment in child's education, Dessy and Pallage (2005) , 
show that when a country is very poor, in order for a ban on the worst forms of child 
labor to bring a Pareto-improvement , appropriate mechanisms must be designed to mit-
igate the decline in child labor wages caused by a ban-induced reduction in employment 
options for children. Swinnerton and Rogers (2005) offer a counter-argument in a mode! 
exploring the welfare effects of banning exploitative forms of child labor. They argue 
that because the ban pushes both the exploited children and the exploiters towards 
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the non-exploitative side of the market, this h~ beneficiai effects on child labor wages. 
They do not discuss, however , the determinants of a government 's ability to enforce 
t he ban on the worst forms of child labor. Yet enforcement is non trivial. While a 
ban has the potential to raise child labor wages in their model, it also has the adverse 
effect of depressing the return to capital, due to reduced market options. Capitalists 
may therefore have a vested interest in opposing such a ban Moehling (1999) , or in 
bringing clown barriers to child exploitation set up by law-enforcement . In Swinnerton 
and Rogers (2005), parents are passive and do not invest in child protection. Although 
parents in their model know that their children can fall victims to traffickers, they do 
not allocate household resources to reducing the probability that their child may be 
trafficked away. Parents in our madel may do that. 
By focusing on the microeconomies of both children 's vulnerability to traffi cking 
and capitalists' decision to supply trafficked children, our research seeks to explain the 
determinants ~f the critical leve! of public expenditures a government must allocate in 
arder to stop child trafficking at the source. It also seeks to explain why poorer countries 
are more likely to be source-countries for child trafficking: since building a protective 
environment for children involves household investment, poverty may make households 
too dependent upon government officiais for the protection of their children. In other 
words, poorer families may substitute public for private barriers against child trafficking. 
As a result , higher public funds are required in poorer than in richer countries in order 
to curb the supply of trafficked children. With economie development , in contrast, 
households become richer ; this enables them to become more effective as protective uni ts 
for their respective children, thus lessening their dependence upon the government to 
build barriers against child out-trafficking. In that case, the criticallevel of government 
effort is lower , which therefore reduces the level of public funds necessary to curb the 
supply. 
If child exploitation or the worst forms of child labor have not been studied much, 
there exists, however, a large literature on child labor, both theoretical and empirical. 
The theoretical literature was initiated by the seminal work of Basu and Van (1998) . 
Among the contributors are Basu (1999, 2000), Swinnerton and Rogers (1999), Baland 
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and Robinson (2000), Ranj an (1999, 2001), Dessy (2000) , Dessy and Pallage (2001), J a-
farey and Lahiri (2002) , Dessy and Vencatachellum (2003), Doepke and Zilibotti (2005). 
The empiricalliterature on child labor is very rich, with contributions by Grootaert and 
Kanbur (1995), Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997), Ravallion and Wodon (2000), Erl-
monds (2005) , Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005). 
3.3 The madel 
The structure of this Section is as follows . We start by set ting up the model environment . 
We then derive a series of lemmas all of which culminate in the characterization of a 
general equilibrium for this economy. The final proposition establishes the limits of 
supply-side policy intervention at the local level. 
y./e consider an economy populated by ex ante identical households, in total size 
normalized to unity. Following Swinnerton and Rogers (2005) , we assume that there 
are also k entrepreneurs living in the economy, each endowed with one unit of capital. 
Therefore k is both the total number of entrepreneurs and the quantity of capital ex-
isting in this economy. Entrepreneurs have two options for earning a return on their 
endowment of capital. One is to combine capital and hired labor to produce the unique 
consumption good; the other is to engage in child trafficking, by illegally transporting 
abducted children and selling them abroad for profit. We denote by kL the population 
of legitimate entrepreneurs, and by kr that of child traffickers, with kL +kr =k. Both 
kL and kr are deterrnined endogenously. 
All households are initially composed of an adult-child pair. Parents are altruistic in 
the sense that they love their children and would suffer from their disappearance. Chil-
dren do nothing in this environment, apart from enjoying parental care and supervision, 
when offered. As long as there are entrepreneurs who find it beneficiai to become child 
traffickers, all parents will be exposed to the risk of losing their offspring. Child traf-
ficking is a criminal activity, which is fought in part through public enforcement of laws 
that guarantee chil<;l .safety and protection, and in part through parental investment in 
child protection. We denote as g the level of public expenditures in anti-child-traffi.cking 
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law-enforcement, and by Xi, the level of private investment in child protection by parent 
i E [0 , 1]. The total barrier available for the protection of the child of parent i is given 
by: 
(3.1) 
We impose the following restriction on the behavior of the function B: 
Assumption 3.1: B (xi , g) = Xi + g Vi. 
Assumption 3.1 st ates that priva te and public investments are additively separable 
contributions to a child's protective environment. 
Given the level of protective barrier surrounding children · in this environment, an 
entrepreneur j who decides to engage in the child trafficking business must choose the 
level of effort, ej, necessary to break clown barriers set up by both parents and the 
government. The aggregate child trafficking effort, e, in this environment is measured 
by: 
(3.2) 
Each parent i knows the conditional probability, Pi, that his child will be trafficked 
away if he is protected by a barrier of level bi, when the aggregate intensity of trafficking 
within the community is e. This conditional probability is described by the following 
function P , whose behavior is made precise in Assumption 3.2: 
(3 .3) 
Assumption 3.2: Function P satisfies the following properties: (1) Pb < 0; (2) Pe > 0; 
{3) Pbb 2: 0; (4) Pbe < 0; (5) P (bi, 0) =O. 
Part (1) of Assumption 3.2 states that increasing the level of child protection reduces 
a child 's vulnerability to traffickers. Part .(2) reflects the fact that an increase in the 
intensity of trafficking raises the risk that a child will fall victim to traffickers. P art (3) 
implies that ceteris paribus, the incrementai reduction in the probability of victimization 
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decreases as barri ers are raised. It also implies that P is bounded below. P art ( 4) states 
that the incrementai gain from r aisîng the level of protective barriers is decreasing in 
the level of aggregate trafficking effort . P art (5) implies that there is no risk of child 
out-t rafficking when no trafficking activity t akes place. 
Each parent is endowed with one unit of labor , which is inelastically supplied to 
legit imate ent repreneurs, in exchange for a wage, w. After earning his labor incarne, 
each parent then bears a child, invest s Xi for his child safety and protect ion, and allocates 
t he remainder , w- Xi , to household consumption, Ci , of the unique consumption good: 
Trafficking activity t hen possibly begins. A parent whose child is safe· and protected 
enjoys a ut ility u(Ci) + 8, where 8 denotes t he ut ility derived from raising a well-protected 
child . In contrast , a parent whose child is trafficked away misses out on t he utility t he 
child once provided and his utility reduces to u(Ci ), where Cf:::; w- Xi. The function u 
satisfies u' > 0, u" < 0.4 
3.3.1 Production of the consumption good 
We take t he consumption good as the economy's numeraire. In the p roduction process 
of this good , entrepreneurs are residual claimants, and exhihit. a price-taking behavior 
in both the labor and the output market s, respectively. An entrepreneur who combines 
his unit endowment of capital wit h l units of labor achieves a level of out put given by 
e f (l) , where e > 0 denotes a productivity parameter , which we take as a proxy for t he 
economy's level of development. The funçtion f satisfies J' > 0, J" < 0, f (0) = 0, 
as well as Inada conditions. Capital tot ally depreciates after its use in the production 
process. Given our normalization of the parent-worker population size, total labor 
supply is equal to 1. Since alllegitimate entrepreneurs operatean ident ical technology, 
in equilibrium, perfect competition implies that they all hire the same amount of labor, 
4 It can be argued that the disutility of losing a child is potentially much la rger than o and possibly 
infinite. Since we do observe children sent to the tabor market in spi te of the risk of trafficking, it must 
be, however, that this cost is bounded above. In absence of bet ter information, we assume without loss 
of generali ty that losing one's child implies the Joss of the utili ty the presence of the chi ld provided the 
parents. 
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l = 1/ kL, and pay a competitive wage given by: 
w = ej' (1/kL) . (3.4) 
Let r L denote the residual claimed by a legitimate entrepreneur. Price-taking behavior 
implies that this residual is given by: 
TL= 8 [f (1/kL)- j' (1/kL) (1/kL)] . (3.5) 
It is immediate to establish that âr L/ âkL = ·1/ kt J" < O.· The return to legitimate 
entrepreneurship thus decreases with the number of entrepreneurs , kL, pursuing a le-
gitimate productive activity. This result has important implications for the supply of 
trafficked children. 
3.3 .2 Child trafficking technology 
Child traffickers are self-employed agents who abduct children from their home and ship 
them abroad in exchange for profit . They combine their unit endowment of capital and 
their own effort , ej, to break down barriers to child trafficking set up by the government 
and by the parents, where j E [0 , kr] . Given the level of private and public barriers 
against child trafficking, it is clear that the number, nr, of children trafficked out of the 
community will be proportiorial to the total number of children living in the economy: 
nr = a, where a E [0 , 1] . The share ais endogenously determined. 
Child traffickers compete for a share of the victims. The number , nrj, of children 
successfully trafficked away by trafficker j is thus given by: 
nrj = a{3j, jE [0 , kr], (3.6) 
{3j = J;r ( e.)'). d~' jE [0 , kr] , 1 (3.7) 
and À denotes the dègree of competition between child traffickers. The shares {3j E [0, kr] 
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are then determined endogenously by individual traffickers' efforts. With respect to the 
value taken by À, we make t he following assumption: 
Assumption 3 .3: W e assum e that there is a certain level of tacit collusion among 
traffickers, so that À is relative/y close to O. 
This assumption reflects the fact that traffickers operate in extremely well organized 
rings, which could hardly be obtained in an environment of fierce competition. 
We also assume for simplicity that the total cost of exerting a child trafficking effort 
is linear in this effort and equal to "{ej , with 'Y > 0.5 Denoting by q the exogenously 
given world priee of each child victim sold abroad, we can write agent j 's return to child 
trafficking as: 
(3. 8) 
3.3.3 The problem of a typical household 
Parents maximize expected utility. A typical parent i solves: 
max { u (w- Xi )+ (1- Pi ) o} 
Xi 
s .t. (3 .1) and (3 .3) 
After substituting in the constraints, the objective function can be rewritten as: 
V (xi, e, g, w) = u (w- Xi) + (1- P [B (xi, g) ; e]) o. (3 .9) 
The following lemma characterizes the optimal leve! of parent i's investment in child 
protection: 
Lemma 3.1 : Let Assumptions 3 .1 and 3.2 hold. Then the optimal parental invest-
ment in child protection is a function X defined by 
X (e, g,w) = argmax V (xi, e, g,w) 
x; 
5This cost may include, for example, transportation costs, and/or other costs necessary to break 
clown protective barriers set up by both the parent and the government. 
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such that {i) X e > 0; {ii) X 9 < 0; and {iii) Xw > O. 
Proof: The fust order condition for a maximum of (3.9) is: 
Given the properties of t he functions u and P, this first arder condition is also sufficient 
· for a maximum. The proof t hen simply follows from taking the tota l derivative of this 
first arder condition and applying the Implicit Function Theorem . • 
Part (i) of Lemma 3.1 states t hat parental investment in child protection rises with 
the intensity of child traffi cking in the economy. Part (ii) states t hat an exogenous 
increase in the level of public expenditures financing law-enforcement against child traf-
fi.cking tends to cause parents to decrease their own investment in child protection. This 
result is a direct implicàtion of the substitutability between private and public invest-
ment. Part (iii) implies that richer parents invest ~ore in child protection than poorer 
on es. 
As an implication of Lemma 1, the conditional probability that a child will be 
trafficked out of the community can be rewritten as follows using (3.3): 
F(e, g,w) = P[X(e,g, w) +g,e] (3. 10) 
Renee the following lemma: 
Lemma 3.2: Under Assumptions 3. 1 and 3.2, and as long as the cast of losing a 
child is not prohibitive, the function P exhibits the following properties: {i) Fe > 0; (ii) 
F9 < 0; {iii) Fw < O. 
Pro of: To prove part (i) , t ake the partial derivative of P with respect to e: 
(3.11) 
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with Xe = u}.!_'§'J>bb. Substituting this expression back into (3.11) yields Pe > 0, for 8 
small enough. 
To prove part (ii), take the partial deriva tive P with respect g: 
since Pb < O. The proof of .daim (iii) follows in the same manner. • 
P art (i) of Lemma 3.2 states that the conditional probability that a child will be 
trafficked in this environment rises with an increase in the aggregate intensity of traf-
ficking. The direct effect on P of an increase in e outweighs the subsequent decrease in 
that probability caused by the response of parents in terms of improved child protection. 
Part (ii) states that an increase in the level of public investment in child protection re-
duces this probability. Finally part (iii) states that this probability is lower the wealthier 
the household in which the child lives. 
It is important to note that by the law of large numbers, the conditional probability, 
P (e, g,w), can be interpreted as the proportion a of children actually victims of child 
traffickers, when the intensity of the child trafficking activity is e, and the state of nature 
is given by (g , w): 
a =F(e, g,w) . (3 .12) 
3.3.4 Inter-sectoral allocation of entrepreneurs 
A typical trafficker j's problem is to choose the level of individual effort , ej, that selves 
the following program: 
(3 .13) 
s. t.(3 .7) and (3 .8) 
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Assuming that each trafficker does not internalize the impact of his action on the others, 
the first arder condition for problem (3.13) is: 
jE [0, kr] (3 .14) 
where /3j is defined in (3.7) and ·>.= )q·- 1 . Since traft)ckers are homogeneous and non-
strategie, they all choose to exert exactly the same level of effort so that e1 = e*, for all 
j . Consequently, each trafficker's market share is f3] = (3* = 1/ kr. 
Therefore, using (3.12) and (3.14), the equilibriurn effort e* is characterized by t.he 
following equation: 
Y(e*, g,q ,B,kr) =0, (3.15) 
where kr denotes the total population of child traffickers , and 
Y( e*, g,q,B, kr) = kre* - P (e* kr ,g,Bj' [(ïë- kr)-1]) q>. . (3 .16) 
Lemma 3.3: Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the trafficking effort e* chosen by each 
child trafficker exists and is a junction E defined by: 
Y [ E (g, q, e, kr) , g, q, e, kr] = 0, 
such that: (i) E9 < 0; (ii) Eq > 0; (iii) Eo < 0; (iv) Ek < O. 
Proof: Using (3.16), we take in turn the derivatives of Y with respect to each 
argument: 
Y e [1- q5.Pe] kr 
Yg = -q5.Pg 
Yq -5-P ( e* kr, g, B j' [ (k- kr f 1]) 
Yo -q5.f'[(k-krf1]Pw 
Yk [ 1- q5.Pe] e* - q>, (k- krf2 Bf"Pw . 
/ 
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Using Assumpt ion 3.3, as .À--+ 0, so does ~--+ 0, and we have Y e > 0 and l k > 0, since 
Fe > 0 and Fw < O. Furthermore, Y 9 > 0, since F9 < O. Finally, Y q < 0 and .Y e > 0 
by inspection. The results then follow from the application of the Implicit function's 
t heorem. • 
Lemma 3.3 characterizes the response of local traffickers to changes in their en-
vironment. It shows that an exogenous increase in the level of public expenditures 
allocated to anti-child-traffi cking law-enforcement t ends to induce traffickers to reduce 
their trafficking effort [Part (i)] . So does economie development [Part (iii)]. Exogenous 
increases in the international priee for trafficked children tend to stimulate traffickers' 
effort [Part (ii)]. An increase in t he number of traffickers has a negative effect on the 
effort level chosen by each trafficker [Part (iv)] . Ali these effects are quite int uitive. 
However, these are only partia l equilibrium effects , as the number of child traffickers 
will adjust in equilibrium. We next characterize the equilibrium inter-sectoral allocation 
of entrepreneurs. 
A general equilibrium for this economy exist s if and only if there exists, ky, such 
that r L = rr, and k'[ = k - ky. In other words, entrepreneurs in equilibrium must be 
indifferent betw:e~n either market. If this were not the case , there would be movements 
of entrepreneurs across markets until returns are equalized . We now proceed to show 
that such an equilibrium exists and is unique. 
First, note that after substituting e* = E (g , q, B, kr ) in (3.10) , the incidence of child 
trafficking is: 
a= P(kr,g,q , B) (3.17) 
where 
(3.18) 
Lemma 3.4: Under Assumptions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, the fun ction P has the following 
properties: (i) A> 0; (ii) P9 < 0; (iii) Pq > 0; (iv} Pe < O. 
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Proof: Using (3 .18) we ean derive the above partial equilibrium effeets as follows : 
pk [e* + kTEk] Pe + e (k- kT) ..:. 2 J"Fw 
P9 kTFeEg + F9 < 0 
Pq kTFeEq > 0 
Po f'Fw < O. 
First, observe from the proof of Lemma 3.3 that as .X --+ 0, kT Ek --+ - e*, so that 
pk--+ e (k- kT) - 2 J"Fw , whieh is positive , sinee Pw < 0 and J" < O. Renee pk > O. 
The s ign of the other partial effeet s a ll follow from Lemma 3.3. R enee the results. • 
Next , we charact erize the optimal return to capital in the ehild traffieking aetivity, 
rT = RT (kT, g, q, B) , as follows: 
T q -R (kT , g, q, B) = kT P (kT, g, q, B)- , e (g , q, e, kT). (3 .19) 
The partial equilibrium effects on the return to capital in the child-traffi cking seetor are 
summarized in the following Lemma: 
Lemma 3.5: Under A ssumptions 3. 1, 3.2 and 3.3, the fun ction R T has the foll owing 
properties: {i) RI < 0; {ii) Rf < 0; {iii) Rr ·> 0; {iv) RI < o. 
Proof: The partial derivatives of RT with respect to each of its arguments are given 
by: 
RI _ qP(kT, g , q, B) + ~ [ p _ k E] (kT )2 kT q k r T k (3.20) 
RT 1 -kT [qP9 - rEgkT] (3 .21) g 
RT q 1 [- - ] kT P (kT , g, q, B) + qPq- r EqkT (3 .22) 
RT 0 k~ [qPo- rEokT] (3 .23) 
Claim 1: RI < O. Again, from the proof of Lernma 3.3 as .X --+ 0, kTEk --+ - e*, whieh , 
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when substituted back into (3.20), implies: 
r 1 [ r - ] Rk =-kr R (kr ,g,q, B) - qPk . 
We know from the proof of Lemma 4 that for X -t 0, Î\ -tB (k- kr f 2 J" Fw. Finally, 
using Lemma 3.2, we end up with: 
(- )-2 
- Bk-kr "" Pk ~ - 11 rn Pbuf . 
-u + urbb 
Now observe that we can always choose the functions P, u and f such that -Pbu" J" -t O. 
Renee the result. • 
Claim 2: RJ < O. From (3 .21) , consider the difference 6 9 = qP9 - rE9 kr . We 
need to show that this difference is negative. From Lemma 3.4, it can be shawn by way 
of substitut ion that: 
Lemma 3.3 implies: 
since X = À/J. Substituting back into 6 9 and re-arranging terms yields: 
for )... -t O. Renee the result. 
Claim 3: R~ > O. From (3 .22) , consider the difference 6q = qPq - rEqkr . It 
suffices to show that this difference is non-negative. From Lernma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4, 
we have: 
We can always choose 1 and the function P such that qFe - 1 ~ O. 
Claim 4: Rf < O. Again, from (3 .23), consider the difference 6o = qPo- rEokr. 
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From Lemma 3 and Lemma 3.4, we have: 
6o = f Pw 1 - A < 0 1 A [ ).q ] 
1- q).Pe 
for ). --t O. Renee the result. • 
Property (i) of Lemma 3.5 states that the return to capital in the child trafficking 
activity is decreasing in the number of entrepreneurs who choose to invest in child 
trafficking. Property (ii) states that this return also decreases with an increase in the 
level of public expenditures allocated to better enforcement of anti-child t rafficking laws. 
Property (iii) states that an exogenous increase in the worldwide priee for t rafficked 
children from the rest of the world causes this return to rise. Property (iv) implies t hat 
this return is higher , the poorer the economy. 
Next, let us re-write the return to capital in the legit imate sector, using (3.5) : 
where 
RL (kr, 8) = 8 (J [L (kr)]- j 1 [L (kr)] (L (kr))) , 
1 L(kr) = ---
k- kr 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
Clearly, the richer the economy, the higher the return to legitimate entrepreneurship: 
R~ > O. 
Furthermore, since L 1 > 0, the smaller the number of legitimate entrepreneurs (i. e., 
t he higher kr), the higher the return to legitimate entrepreneurship : 
RL = - 1 J" > 0. 
k (k-kr) 3 
Finally, we define 
a (kr , g, q, 8) = Rr (kr, g, q, 8) - RL (kr, 8) (3.26) 
to be the net gain from choosing illegitimate entrepreneurship (i.e., child trafficking). 
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The following Lemma obtains as an implication of Lemma 3.5: 
Lemma 3.6: Under A ssumptions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, the junction <J has the following 
properties: {i) Œk < 0; {ii) Œg < 0; {iii) Œq > 0; {iv) iTIJ < O. 
Property (i) of Lemma 3.6 states that the net gain from engaging in child out-
trafficking decreases with the number of agents who opt for this strategy as a means 
to earn a return on their capital. Property (ii) states that this net gain decreases 
the more active the government is in enforcing the law against child out-trafficking. 
Property (üi), in contrast states that an exogenous increase in the international priee 
for trafficked children causes this net gain to rise. Property (iv) states that this net gain 
is higher in poorer countries than in their richer counterparts. 
We define a general equilibrium for this economy as a situation where entrepreneurs 
are indifferent as to the sector in which they invest their capita l. In other words, in 
equilibrium, returns to capital are equalized across both sectors: 
<J (kr , g, q, B) = O. (3.27) 
A general equilibrium is therefore an inter-sectoral allocation of capital (ki, kT ), and 
an incidence of child out-trafficking a * , such that (i) kT salves (3.27) , (ii) ki = k- kT, 
and (iii) 
a*= P(kT, g, q, e) . (3 .28) 
The following Lemma obtains as an implication of Lemma 3.6 and the Implicit 
Function Theorem: 
Lemma 3. 7: Under Assumptions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, there exists a function "' defined 
by <J ["- (g, q, B) , g, q, B] = 0 such that: (i) "-g < 0; (ii) "-q > 0; (iii) "'IJ < 0, where 
kT = "'(g, q, B) , denotes the value of kr that salves {3.27). 
Lemma 3.7 shows that , ceteris paribus the number of child traffi.ckers within a given 
source country decreasês with better law-enforcement. Traffi.ckers react to the interna-
tional priee for children: a higher priee, ceteris paribus attracts more traffickers in the 
business. This can happen either if the world supply is curbed or if the world demand 
expands. Moreover, Lemma 7 states that the proportion of child traffi.ckers is higher in 
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poorer than in richer countries. There are two underlying causes for this result. On one 
hand, where poverty is p ervasive, parents do not invest adequately in child protection; 
this weakens the household as an effective protective unit against child trafficking. On 
the other, poverty may push entrepreneurs to seek the higher returns to capital provided 
in t he illegitimate trafficking business. 
By characterizing the solution to equation (3.27), Lemma 3. 7 also implicitly estab-
lishes the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.1: Under A ssumptions 1, 2 and 3, an equilibrium exists and is 
unique. 
We now turn to the discussion of policy action. 
3.3.5 Policy responses to child traffi.cking in a source-country 
Using (3 .28) and substituting in the equilibrium kr , the equilibrium incidence of child 
trafficking boils down to the following function: 
a* = P* (g, q, B) , 
where P* (g, q, B) = P [~~: (g , q, B) , g, q, B]. 
The following Lemma obtains as an implication of Lemma 7. 
Lemma 3.8: Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the function P* has the following 
properties: (i) P; < 0; (ii) P; > 0; (iii) Pô < O. 
Proof: Taking the partial derivatives of P* with respect to its arguments and using 
the previous Lemmas, we find : 
P; PkKg + P9 < 0 
P; = PkKq + Pq > 0 
Pô PkKo + Po < 0. 
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Proper ty (i) of Lemma 3.8 states that ceteris paribus better law-enforcement fi-
nanced by an increase in public investment reduces the incidence of child trafficking. 
However, this effect can be undermined by any mechanism that puts an upward pres-
sure on the international priee for children [property (ii)] . Similar supply-side policies 
abroad typically have this effect. Property (iii) states that economie development causes 
the incidence of child out-trafficking to decline. As the wealth of households increases , 
with economie development, these households become more effective protective units 
for their children. Property (iii) therefore explains ~hy poorer countries are more likely 
to be source countries for child trafficking, while richer countries are more likely to be 
destination countries . 
. However , since the source country acting in autarky cannot influence the inter-
national demand for trafficked children, policy discussions of the eradication of child 
t rafficking that emphasize supply-side interventions in source countries are likely to fail 
if they ignore the negative spillover caused by similar policies elsewhere. Increased po-
lice -inspections, border patrols, and raising public awareness , while necessary, are not 
by themselves sufficient for the complete elimination of child trafficking in source coun-
' 
tries. In our model, complete elimination of child out-trafficking by government officiais 
acting in autarky would imply that the level of public expenditures on law-enforcement , 
g, be chosen such that P * (g, q, B) = O. The following proposition characterizes the 
determinants of that level. It is a straightforward application of Lernma 8. 
Proposition 3.2: There exists a function G defined by P* [G (q , B), q, B] = 0, such 
that (i) Gq > 0, and (ii) Go < 0, where Ci= 8Gj8j, j = q, B. 
Proposition 3.2 implies that any action that causes the international priee for traf- · 
ficked children to rise generates a negative externality on the fight against child traf-
ficking in a source country: it causes the level of public expenditures necessary for a 
complete elimination of child trafficking to increase (i.e., Gq > 0) . Proposition 3.2 also 
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suggests that, in poorer countries, the burden of fighting child trafficking almost lies 
entirely with the government. The poorer the country, the higher the level of pub-
lic expenditures necessary to completely eliminate child trafficking (i.e., Go < 0) . In 
poo rer countriés, parents are less capable of providing adequate _protection for their chil-
dren. Renee governments may need to make a disproportionate contribution to child 
protection as compared to richer countries. 
There is an element of tragedy in Proposition 3.2. On the one hand, it implies 
that only international coordination can fight child trafficking. On the other hand, it 
suggests that policies aimed at fighting the supply alone are misguided. The problem 
with Proposition 3.2 is that it mimicks the myopie reasoning of an individual country 
assurning that its actions do not affect the world priee for trafficked children. Clearly, 
this is a mistake. As all countries can apply the same reasoning, policies to combat 
traffickers will curb the supply, make the priee skyrocket and attract more traffickers 
into the business. The fight of child trafficking from the supply side only is therefore 
utterly vain. The prerequisited policies are those that put a negative pressure on the 
world priee of children. Such policies invariably lead us to a fight on the demand . 
Indeed, if destination countries first t arget the demand, they make it easier for souf'~e 
countries to fight the supply, as Proposition 3.2 suggests . 
This chapter argues that simply sending traffickers to jail , while this may serve 
justice well, will hardly reduce the trafficking of children. Removing a trafficker from 
the field makes the business more profitable to other traffickers and attracts more en-
trepreneurs into the trade, unless action is also taken to make the priee drop. Making 
it too costly for pedophiles to risk having sexual relations with children at home or in 
other destination countries is an important element of such policy.6 Prosecuting those 
who use child soldiers is another. Deterring penalties should be designed for each pilar 
of the demand. For this attack on the demand side, coordinated action at the global 
level is important. Adopting a strong and unified penal code on the use of traffi cked 
children is a first step. Enforcing such code is the second. As rich countries tend to 
suggest that poor countries, by being too lenient on traffickers, are responsible for the 
6 Adopting and enforcing child sex tourism legislation is an important step. 
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trafficking business, it may come as a cold shower to realize that a successful policy 
intervention fust implies a fight in their own backyard . 
3 .4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter develops a model to advocate the need for an internationally coordinated 
action against child trafficking between source and destination countries. The model 
emphasizes the microeconomies of both children 's vulnerability to trans-boundary traf-
ficking and individual entrepreneurs' decision to engage in the business of child traffick-
ing. 
Our results shed light on the externality the actions of richer countries may exert 
on poorer countries in the fight against child trafficking. In particular , it does not seem 
appropriate for rich countries to pressurize poor countries to immediately adopt similar 
protect ion mechanisrns as the ones they have a lready put in place. On the one hand , 
putting such pressure on poor countries would imply disregarding the fact that it is 
more costly for poor countries to achieve the same protection of their children. Well 
intended actions of rich countries have indeed pushed up the priee for children. Second, 
the fight against child trafficking cannot neglect the demand side. As long as the priee is 
high enough, there will be traffickers. Prior to further supply-side policies, governments 
need to find a way to make t he priee of trafficked children drop. Coordinated action on 
the demand side by destination countries is thus a prerequisite to supply-side policie~ 
in source countries. Clearly international cooperation is at the core of any successful 
intervention. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - - - - -- ----------' 
Table 3.1 :An Overview of Intenational Child Trafficking Flows 
Regions Source Countries Receiving Countries 
(GDP per capita) (GDP per capita) 
Nigeria (875) 
Benin (1,070) Cote d'Ivoire (1,500) Cameroon (1,700) 
Africa Gabon (5,700) Mali (860) Cote d'Ivoire (1 ,500) 
Cameroon (1,700) 
Togo (1,500) Gabon (5,700) 
Nigeria (875) 
Taiwan (18,000) 
South and Malaysia (9,300) Australia (27,000) Japan (28,000) South-East 
Asia Hong Kong (26,000) 
Ne pal (1400) Pakistan (2, 100) 
Bangladesh (l ,700) ln dia (2,540) 
Latin and Honduras (2,600) Canada (29,400) United States (37,000) Central America Costa Rica (8,500) Canada (29,400) 
Albani a (4,500) Ital y (25,000) Greece (19,000) 
Eastern Europe German y (26,600) 
Lithuania (8,400) Denmark (29,000) Netherlands (26,900) 
Israel (19,000) 
(Sources: Unicef and World Bank. GDP per capita in PPP 
from The Worldfactbook 2003) 
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Figure 3.a 
General Conclusion 
Over the recent years there has been a growing interest for individual behaviors in 
order to gain better insights into the development process. The breakthroughs in both 
micro and macro economies ·hugely contributed in placing micro foundations at the 
heart of the development analysis. The research undertaken in the frame of my thesis 
is in line with this practice. My goal when building from the micro leve! has been to 
rely upon individual decisions by sorne optimizing agents to understand the dynamics 
of economie development. This explains why echoing to the idea that 'human capital 
is the engine of economie development,' the first essay develops a mode! where trade 
liberalization changes factors' relative demands and gives rise to a skill premium in 
wage which provides individuals with the requisite· incentive for human capital 
accumulation. 
Assuming that the economy under consideration has a comparative advantage in 
crop production, trade liberalization causes the relative prize of the import competing 
good to fall. The import competing sector then shrinks under foreign competition, and 
releases productive resources that can be used in the other sectors of the economy. In 
the first essay my theory lies on the idea that skilled labor flows into the agricultural 
research and extension services sector, whereas physical capital is relocated in 
agriculture. Combining physical capital with inputs from the intermediate sector 
ultimately triggers a process of capital augmenting technical progress, whereby 
physical capital substitutes for unskilled labor in agriculture. As agricultural output 
expands using more and more inputs from the research and extension services sector, 
the demand for skilled labor rises and pushes the expected return to education up. 
Considering that physical capital is also substituting for unskilled labor in agriculture, 
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the skill premium in wage rises and acts as a catalyst for human capital accumulation . 
Structural t ransformation of the economy then follows from this process. 
T he process of trade-induced structural transformation as described above, not only 
has t he appealing feature to be based O.I1 individual optimizing decisions, but also seems 
to match some recent development experiences such as India or Brazil, both which 
exper ts now consider as emerging economies . According to my analysis, trade barriers 
set or faced by developing countries are accountable for underdevelopment . 
The development mechanics hence highlighted clearly points to a major role of edu-
cation in fostering the process . The provision of educational resources therefore, appears 
to be of prime importance. However , in many developing countries, access to quality 
education is a privilege afforded only to an elite group, hence the relevance of my second 
essay, which investigates the conflicts surrounding the allocation of public educational 
resources. 
In chapter 2, I consider a set t ing where investment in a child 's education can either 
have a private or a public source in a mult i-group society. Since public educational 
resources are limited , individuals belonging to the same social group ( defined on the 
basis of race, religion, or ethnicity), may have. a vested interest in excluding members 
of other social groups from sharing in. This explains the competit ion over publicly-
funded educational resources, which may give rise to social exclusion in t he sense t hat 
sorne groups are left out. Under these considerations and assuming that everyone in 
the society has the opportunity to vote over the degree of exclusion to be tolerated 
in t he society, I show that social exclusion cannot emerge within a society with no or 
low asymmetry in popula tion size. However , to the extent that there is a significant 
asymmetry in p opulation size, t he majority group may have an interest in supporting a 
high degree of exclusion. this is because each tnember of t he majori ty only contribute a 
small amount in the contest effort of its group relative to other groups members, which 
implies t hat they can privately invest more resources in their offspring's education. 
My results therefore points to the immigration policy as a deviee to reduce popula-
tion size asymmetry, a llowing a democratie voting system to impede the emergence of 
social exclusion. 
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My analysis of social exclusion also illustra tes the fact that it not always the case 
that households as a whole will ali be able to afford the same level of expenditure to 
the. benefit of their offspring. The USDA's annual reports clearly show that households' 
investment in teens ' education increases with parental income. Moreover, in poor coun-
tries, parents may not be able to adequately invest in they child 's wellbeing. Poverty 
and low public resources sometimes combine to give rise to a situation where children 
do not enjoy a safe environment out of the familial frame. This m akes them as much 
potential victims for well organized networks of criminals lying in wait. 
In my final essay I show that as sorne countries' effectiveness in fighting child traf-
fickers increases, criminals switch their activities towards countries with less effective 
protection , whether because poverty makes households too dependant upon public re-
sources in child protection , or because of governmental failures in enforcing the law. 
This arises from the fact that for a given demand for child victims, curbing the supply 
in sorne countries pushes the international priee of a victim up, providing criminals with 
the incentive to increase their efforts to lure and corrupt children elsewhere. Coping 
with trafficking activities in other countries hence becomes harder , and this explains 
why in relative terms, trafficking fiows are from poor to rich countries. 
My analysis therefore illustrates the limits of existing international conventions 
which only call for more laws to punish traffick in human beings. Beyond the adoption 
of more laws or conventions, I question the capacity of sorne countries to implement 
such measures absence of more cooperation at the international level. Such cooperation 
may take the form of information sharing, t echnical and logistic assistance, or even 
multilateral agreements to sue traffickers no matter states' boundaries. 
Overall my thesis tackles very different issues facing today's developing coùntries and 
provides sorne policy recommendations as to how to cape with the respective stakes. 
Building from micro foundations allows me to clearly illustrate the forces coming into 
play, which also implies a better understanding of the channels through which such 
policies may affect people's behavior. 
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